

FOREIGN OFFICE ORGANIZATION

By

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*A Comparison of the Organization of the British,
French, German and Italian Foreign Offices
with that of The Department of State of
The United States of America*

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FOREWORD

AT this time, when the foreign influence of the United States is expanding so rapidly, the Academy deems itself fortunate in being able to present to its members a comprehensive study of the organization of the Foreign Offices of Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany as compared with the Department of State of the United States.

Students of American foreign relations have felt for some time past that, owing in part to insufficient appropriations and in part to other reasons, the Department of State is inadequately equipped to handle effectively the increasingly complicated problems confronting our Government.

The Directors of the Academy deemed it desirable to undertake a study of the organization and operation of the Foreign Offices of the leading European countries with a view to ascertaining whether they presented any lessons of value to the United States.

Mr. Henry Kittredge Norton, who has had wide experience in the study of international affairs, undertook this important work and the results of his investigation are presented herewith.

CLYDE L. KING.

INTRODUCTION

THAT the Great War has resulted in giving the United States an international position of vastly greater importance than that held before 1914 is generally appreciated.¹ At the outbreak of that conflict the United States was one among seven or eight world powers, and possibly the least intimately concerned with matters of world politics. Although we had widespread foreign interests, they were comparatively small and seldom provoked serious international issues. While the other powers respected us in this hemisphere and made some allowance for our ideas in the Far East, they concerned themselves little with our opinions or our actions as to international questions in Europe, then the center of world politics.

Today the situation bears quite another aspect. While the war destroyed several of the old European powers and retarded for perhaps two decades the progress of the others, it spurred the United States to a development in industry, finance and commerce, which has brought it unquestioned primacy in these spheres. We have become,

almost overnight, the world's largest creditor and the world's most powerful competitor. This transformation has given us a political importance to which we are quite unaccustomed and of which we have not yet realized all the implications. Many in high office still give voice to the idea that we should cling to our old tradition of isolation and disinterestedness in the affairs of other countries. While the impossibility of pursuing any such policy is now generally recognized, we have still to shake ourselves free from the idea that we can fix for ourselves the extent to which we shall become involved in any particular matter. We are beginning to realize that even this degree of liberty has been taken from us and that what we *do not do* may have quite as real an effect as what we *do*. As Mr. Lionel Curtis, a distinguished Englishman, has put it in addressing an American audience, "There are great issues which you alone can decide—and you will decide them nonetheless if you shrink from a decision."

Another aspect of this extension of the limits within which we must necessarily take action is only beginning to be understood. That is, the greatly enhanced importance and the vastly increased responsibilities of the Department of State. That this Department is in a sense *sui generis* has been recognized from the time of the Constitutional Convention. It is considered in a more intimate sense than any of the other departments as specially responsible to the President, and consequently has been subjected to a less degree of Congressional supervision. This has had both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, it has served to give to the Chief Executive the freedom of action which

¹ The following quotation from Secretary Kellogg's statement before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations for the State Department is of interest in this connection "According to the statistics compiled by the Census Bureau, the national wealth of the United States in 1922 was \$320,803,862,000. This was nearly double what it was in 1912 and nearly four times as much as in 1900. The foreign trade of the United States amounted to \$9,221,206,342 in 1927, which was nearly three times the amount in 1910, over four times that of 1900 and nearly six times that of 1890. The number of Americans travelling abroad has enormously increased. Only 20,320 passports were issued to travelling Americans in 1914, while for 1928 the number issued was 188,236. American investments in foreign countries have increased from \$8,105,000,000 in 1923 to approximately \$13,500,000,000 in 1927."

must be his if he is adequately to deal with foreign problems. On the other hand, it has resulted in a considerable lack of sympathy between Congress and the State Department and a consequent lack of provision for adequate staffing.

The shortcomings of our diplomatic and consular organization were so patent during and after the war that Congress gave the matter considerable study. The result was the passing of the so-called Rogers Act on May 24, 1924. This Act established the "Foreign Service of the United States," combining therein the old diplomatic and consular services. The result has been in many ways beneficial, although the Act has by no means done all that its sponsors hoped it would do. Its failures are due, in part at least, to the fact that it dealt only with the officials who represent the country abroad. It did not touch the State Department itself. That remains today a somewhat haphazard growth from the time when our foreign relations were a comparatively small item in our national life. An organization which was established to deal with occasional and comparatively simple questions, has suddenly been shouldered with the responsibility for the handling of innumerable and extremely complicated issues. It is little wonder that the country has found much to criticize in the work of the Department. The real wonder is that it has been able to carry on as well as it has.

While attention has been called to

this situation on various occasions ever since the Spanish-American war, it is only within the last two years that it has begun to receive the serious consideration it deserves. As a result of this recent interest three bills, known respectively as the Moses Bill, the Rogers Bill, and the Porter Bill, have been introduced into Congress for the purpose of providing the State Department with facilities which will enable it more adequately to perform its duties.

It is not the purpose of the present study to pass on the relative merits of these bills, but rather to make available information on the organization of the great European foreign offices which may be of value in the consideration of any proposals for the reorganization of our own State Department. To this end the writer spent several months during the past year in London, Paris, Berlin and Rome examining the organization and functioning of the British, French, German and Italian foreign offices.

It is apparent that any estimate of the effectiveness of the organization of any particular foreign office must be based in some measure upon a judgment of the personal abilities of, and the conditions surrounding, the men who staff it. Here we are dealing with intangibles and while it is possible to give due weight to maturity, training, experience and status in the community, there remains a large element of personal appraisal which can hardly be avoided.

SUMMARY

THE comparison of the five offices leads to some general observations which it may be useful to state in summary form here:

1. All four of the European foreign offices examined depend for their staffs almost altogether upon the diplomatic and consular officers of career. The State Department higher offices have been manned to a large extent by special appointment.

2. The salaries paid to officials in the European foreign offices, while, except in Great Britain, they are lower in absolute figures than those paid American officers, nevertheless in every case stand higher in the scale of incomes in the country concerned. In London the higher officers receive salaries which are actually larger than those of our own officials. Even where the actual salaries are lower, the foreign offices, because of the much higher social and official position accorded to their officers and because of other economic and social considerations which are inoperative in the United States, are able to call into their service and keep there a more mature ability than is the American State Department.

3. The six or eight high executive positions in the European foreign offices carry a high rank in government service and have correspondingly high pay. With two or three ambassadorial posts these positions are looked upon as the goal of the foreign service officials. The tendency is thus to gather the men of greatest ability at the capital to aid in determining and directing foreign policy. In our State Department the responsible executive positions carry comparatively low salaries and are frequently looked upon as stepping stones to legations, even of minor importance. The resulting tendency is to disperse good men into

the field, increase the turnover and decrease the average of experience and maturity in the home office.

4. As a result of these tendencies the foreign ministers have the continuous assistance of a much more highly trained and experienced staff than has the Secretary of State. Before a foreign minister takes action on any matter, large or small, he can have before him the results of the studies of at least three or four experts, with an experience equivalent to that of ministers. The Secretary of State may find himself called upon to make a decision where he has the advice only of a minor official, or, even if he calls his whole executive staff into conference, of a body, no member of which, has ever had ministerial experience.

5. The executive personnel of the European foreign offices is such as to command the respect of public opinion, even including that which is voiced by the opposition to the Ministry in power. The foreign offices thus work in collaboration with an informed public opinion. The executive personnel of the State Department, while it includes men of unquestioned ability and while it is characterized by a high average of devotion to the public service, is little known to the public and is frequently subjected to hasty and ill-informed criticism.

6. The European states, covered by this survey, all devote a larger proportion of their national budgets to their respective foreign offices than does the United States to the State Department.

7. Such a discrepancy between the United States and foreign countries, in regard to the handling of international affairs, places this country at a disadvantage, both in protecting the interests of its citizens and in giving effect to its desire to assist in establishing world peace.

Foreign Office Organization

CHAPTER I

THE CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICES

requirements for the organization of any foreign office must relate fundamentally to the location of the responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations under the constitution of the country concerned. While in the five countries covered in the present survey the foreign offices occupy a constitutional position sufficiently similar to make much the same demands upon them, nevertheless there are constitutional differences which it will be well to bear in mind as a preface to a more detailed study of their respective organizations.

GREAT BRITAIN

Theoretically the power to conduct the foreign relations of the British Empire is still a prerogative of the Crown. This prerogative is, however, exercised through, and of course by, the Ministry in power. While the Foreign Minister is a member of the Cabinet and stands or falls with it, Parliament has not yet succeeded in establishing more specific and detailed control over the conduct of foreign relations. The Government can always refuse to give information to Parliament on the ground that it would be prejudicial to the public interest.¹ Treaties are made and ratified without parliamentary approval. All diplomatic negotiations may be carried on without reference to the Houses.

It is in regard to declaring war that Parliament has secured the largest measure of control over the royal prerogative. Gladstone asserted as

early as 1856 that Parliament had a right to be consulted before the country was involved in a war.² Sir Edward Grey recognized the necessity of parliamentary consent as a preliminary to the war against Germany. Nevertheless it has not been possible to secure a formal resolution embodying this principle. Efforts have been made since 1886, but none has been successful.³

The adoption of a formal resolution requiring the submission to Parliament of the question of war or peace would in any case have comparatively little effect if the Foreign Office retained an uncontrolled direction of the handling of the diplomacy which leads up to the actual issue of war. This was aptly illustrated in the case of the Great War. Up to July 31, 1914, Parliament was opposed to entering the struggle, but the diplomatic situation inevitably involved Great Britain.⁴

After the war the Labor Party took the lead in an effort to extend parliamentary control over British diplomacy. In 1918 Mr. Charles Trevelyan introduced a motion to establish a Foreign Affairs Committee, but the motion was defeated.⁵ In 1921 the Labor Party declared it would not regard as valid any agreement with a foreign government not approved by Parliament. When the Labor Party came into power in 1924, the Government announced that it would lay all treaty drafts before Parliament for twenty-one days before they were

¹ Flournoy, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

² *Ibid.*, p. 260, *et seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 228.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 266.

¹ F. R. Flournoy, *Parliament and War*. London: P. S. King, 1927, p. 140.

ratified. The Baldwin Government has not seen fit to continue this practice.

The increasing influence of the Labor Party makes more desirable and even more necessary a parliamentary discussion of foreign policy. Formerly, whatever differences there might have been between the Conservative and Liberal parties on matters of home policy, they made an effort to agree on foreign policy. The aim of every government was to decide international issues as far as possible *with* the Opposition and not *against* it.⁶ The theory was that foreign affairs were above party politics and until recent years the views of the two great parties were near enough together to make this theory workable. In the face of the wide divergence of view between Conservative and Labor ideas on foreign policy, such an amicable arrangement will hardly be possible in the future. Without some formal extension of the control of Parliament over the Foreign Office, Parliament would be thrown back on its so-called political control, that is the power to dismiss a Ministry when its actions are unsatisfactory to a majority of the House of Commons. The practical effect of this sort of control is easily exaggerated.⁷ When a Ministry feels it has popular opinion behind it, it can hold the threat of dissolution over the members. Still more serious is the fact that the House would hesitate to dismiss a Cabinet on a question of foreign policy when it approves the Cabinet's domestic policy. While there is a measure of influence by the House due to the desire of the Ministry not to antagonize its majority, still a Government knowing that it had the House with it on the larger issues could easily defy it on minor matters. Thus an unsatisfactory foreign policy can be sheltered behind a satisfactory domes-

tic policy. In so far as foreign policy is concerned, the House tends to become a mere register of popular approval of the ministerial course. The Government has it within its power to conceal or disclose such facts as it chooses and without a Foreign Affairs Committee to investigate on its account, Parliament must in practice accept what is given it.⁸

Under such circumstances the British Foreign Office has become in and of itself a tremendous power, not only in the Empire but in international affairs generally. Its highly capable and widely experienced staff endows British foreign policy with an inertia against which a Foreign Minister, a political appointee with at best four or five years tenure of office, can make little headway. It is generally accepted that the influence of the Foreign Office on the Foreign Minister is quite as great as the influence of the Foreign Minister on the Foreign Office. On at least one occasion, when the Labor Party was in power, the Foreign Office staff were accused of withholding from the Government documents which they thought might weaken their case.⁹

It was inevitable under such circumstances that critics should sooner or later be found who would denounce the bureaucracy of Downing Street. Whatever may be one's opinion as to tendencies of British foreign policy—and an enormous amount has been said both for and against it—there can be little question that without an extension of parliamentary control, it would be quite possible for the British Foreign Office to wield a power which to its opponents at least would at times appear

⁶ Flournoy, *op cit.*, p. 250.

⁹ Many statements of both fact and opinion in this report are based upon conversations with the officials concerned. In such cases, citation of the authority would involve a breach of confidence.

⁶ "Augur" *Peace in Europe*, p. 10.

⁷ Flournoy, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

to have a sinister aspect. The probabilities along this line should not, however, be exaggerated. All great issues are decided, not between the Foreign Minister and the Foreign Office, but in the Cabinet. Here influences are met which sometimes completely reverse Foreign Office decisions. It is in the net result of these forces that one finds the reasons for turns in British foreign policy which defy other explanation.

FRANCE

The Constitution of the French Republic is embodied in certain "Organic Laws" passed in 1875. One article of these laws provides that "the President of the Republic negotiates and ratifies treaties; he communicates them to the Chambers as soon as the interests and the safety of the State allow." This would appear to put the President of France in a legal position similar to the theoretical position of the King of England. It is, however, further provided that "treaties of peace, of commerce, treaties which affect the finances of the state, treaties relative to the status of persons and to the property rights of Frenchmen abroad," are only binding after having been voted by the two Chambers. No cession, no exchange, no adjudication of territory can take place save under a law. The President of the Republic cannot declare war without the prior consent of the two Chambers. Other articles provide that "the legislative power is exercised by the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate," that "acts of the President of the Republic must be countersigned by a Minister" and that "the Ministers are jointly responsible before the Chambers for the general policy of the Government and individually for their personal acts."¹⁰

These provisions endow the French parliament with many of the powers of

control over foreign relations enjoyed by the American Congress. It has even been contended that the enumerated kinds of treaties which are only binding "after having been voted by the two Chambers" are so nearly all-inclusive that in practice no treaty can be ratified without prior parliamentary consent.

This, however, is to make too broad a claim for the powers of the French parliament. In the first place the President has complete freedom in the negotiation of treaties—a freedom which is jealously guarded by the President and readily conceded by the Chambers themselves. For example, in April, 1919, a resolution was introduced in the Chamber of Deputies, requesting the Government "to maintain and carry through at the peace conference the principle that Germany must keep neither army, nor military organization, nor armaments of any kind." The proposed resolution was ruled out by the presiding officer of the Chamber on the ground that it was an interference with the President's right of negotiation. Nor is the right to ratify as broad as that vested in the United States Senate. The French Executive is under no obligation to inform the Chambers of the terms of treaties arrived at with foreign powers, or even of the existence of such treaties, provided they are not within the specified classes. The treaty of Berlin of 1878, important as it was in the diplomacy of the Near East, was not submitted to parliament. The Franco-German Convention concerning Morocco made in November, 1911, was not submitted to the Chambers. Neither the Franco-Czechoslovak treaty of January, 1924, nor the Franco-Belgian Military Convention, has ever been submitted or described to the Chambers.¹¹

¹⁰ Cmd. 2282, Misc. 19 (1924), p. 14.

¹¹ Cmd. 2282, Misc. 19 (1924), p. 15.

It will thus be seen that the French Executive has a constitutional power to conclude secret treaties, which are binding upon the country, though they may never have come to the knowledge of the French parliament, or any Committee thereof. Except for this somewhat limited field, parliamentary control of French foreign policy corresponds roughly to Congressional control in the United States. The Chamber of Deputies has a Foreign Affairs Commission, a Customs Commission, a Commerce and Industry Commission and a Finance Commission, all of which may concern themselves with questions affecting foreign nations. In the Senate there are Commissions on Foreign Affairs and General Policy in the Protectorates, on Customs and Commercial Conventions, on Commerce, Industry, Labor and Ports, and on Finance. All bills, or proposed acts of the Government, in their respective spheres, are referred to these commissions, or a commission appointed specially for the purpose. The commission is entitled to examine the competent Minister or with his consent his subordinates. The Minister can, if he is certain of his support in the Chamber, refuse to attend or to allow his officials to do so.¹² But this is a matter of political discretion. On a question of foreign policy, the Minister can always say that it is not in the public interest to answer.

It is apparent that France follows a practice halfway between the American and the British systems. The French parliament has a large measure of the control exercised by the American Congress, but nonetheless the Executive still retains the power to make secret agreements and to bind the nation without the consent or even the knowledge of parliament. The Foreign Office is then in practice partly at the

service of the Executive and in still greater part under the control of the legislature. This control is made still more effective by the detailed consideration by the parliament of the Foreign Office budget where matters both of policy and personnel receive more detailed criticism than is the custom in England.

GERMANY

The scheme of organization as regards the handling of foreign affairs in Germany approaches still more closely the American system. Under the Weimar Constitution, sovereign powers are vested in the Reichstag and the President. The Reichstag alone has the power to declare war or conclude peace and the President enjoys no veto on legislation. The President can, however, conclude alliances and make treaties, with foreign states, provided they are not treaties which take the country into, or conclude, war. His acts, however, require the countersignature of the Chancellor and the competent Minister and they are subject to dismissal by the Reichstag. A Committee for Foreign Affairs is set up by Article 35 of the Constitution itself. This Committee is charged to keep the foreign policy of the Government under permanent observation and to exercise permanent control. It can sit when the Reichstag is not in session and can even continue to meet in the interval between a dissolution and the assembly of a new Reichstag. It has access to all official documents and the right to summon and examine officials.¹³ The control over the Executive is, then, much more complete than in England and even stronger than in France. Even the natural hesitancy about dismissing a Ministry on a question of foreign policy is eliminated by a provision of the Constitu-

¹² Cmd. 2282, Misc. 19 (1924), p. 19.

¹³ Cmd. 2282, Misc. 19 (1924), p. 24.

tion (Article 54) which enables the Reichstag to dismiss the Foreign Minister by an adverse vote. In addition to this the Reichstag has complete control over the budget of the Foreign Office which is presented with the same meticulous attention to detail as in France.

ITALY

The Italian constitutional formula on foreign affairs is a cross between that of England and France. The negotiation and conclusion of international treaties come within the prerogative of the Crown. The Constitution prescribes, however, that notice of them must be given to the Chamber "as soon as the interests and security of the State permit, and the appropriate communications must be made on the subject to the Chambers." In the case of treaties which involve a financial burden or effect the territory of the state, the approval of parliament is required. In addition to this usage, the practice has been established of submitting to parliament all treaties which require any alteration or departure from the laws in force in the kingdom.¹⁴

Under the recent changes in governmental affairs introduced by the Fascist revolution, there is considerable doubt as to the applicability of these or any other constitutional principles. So complete is the personal control of Mussolini that, so far as practical questions are concerned, the Foreign Office is simply an advisory organization in his supreme control of Italian foreign affairs.

THE UNITED STATES

The Constitution of the United States vests in Congress the power to declare war and gives the President power by and with the advice and

consent of the Senate to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur. In practice these provisions have worked out to mean that the President, with the aid of the Secretary of State, conducts the foreign relations of this country up to the point where an international agreement is to be entered into. The Constitution gives notice to the world that no such agreement will be considered binding upon the United States except it be duly ratified by a two-thirds vote in the Senate. The making of secret treaties is thus beyond the power of the United States government.

The large measure of control which the Constitution gives to the Senate is made still more effective by the fact that any treaty requiring an appropriation must secure such appropriation by the action of both Houses of Congress. Both Houses have their committees in charge of international affairs, that in the Senate being known as the Committee on Foreign Relations and that in the House as the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

The State Department is looked upon as an organization specially constituted to assist the President in the conduct of foreign relations and hence as pertaining more particularly to the executive branch of the government and enjoys some immunity from the strict control which Congress exercises over the other departments of administration. For example the State Department makes no annual report of its activities. Nevertheless the budget of the Department is carefully examined in both Houses of Congress every year. Also every action which affects in any way our relations with other countries is the subject of lively debate on our foreign policy. Seldom does the President succeed in getting very far from the ideas of Congressional majorities on any foreign issue.

¹⁴ Cmd 2282, Misc 19 (1924), p 30 *

There have been cases where a particularly energetic President who interested himself deeply in foreign affairs has played a rôle more like that of a European Foreign Minister. Roosevelt is perhaps the outstanding example of this. He participated in the Algeciras Conference, purely a European affair, came to a secret understanding with Japan over Korea and the Philippines and took it upon himself to notify France and Germany that if they came to the assistance of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War they would have to reckon with the opposition of the United States.¹⁵ How promptly any such activities can be brought to a halt by a hostile Congress is illustrated by the fate of President Wilson's negotiation of the Versailles

¹⁵ Tyler Dennett *Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War*. New York: Doubleday, 1925, p. 2.

Treaty and the Anglo-French-American security pacts.

The United States is practically compelled by its organic law to forego whatever advantages there may be in secret diplomacy and to confine itself to open diplomacy. This fact by no means diminishes the importance of the Department of State. Under a system which permits secret diplomacy a foreign office must be ably manned in order that the country it represents may not be overreached by the greater skill of its opponents. Under a government which permits only open diplomacy the department in charge should also be able to command the highest degree of skill and ability in order that it may meet the representatives of other nations on an equal footing and that it may offer a real leadership of public opinion concerning foreign relations.

CHAPTER II

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICES

EVERY foreign office has under its direction a foreign service, consisting mainly of diplomatic and consular officers, stationed at important points in practically all countries of the world. In a foreign capital, it is usually represented by an ambassador or a minister according to the importance of the country and of its relations with the government concerned. The ambassador or minister is chief of a mission known as an embassy or a legation. This is staffed by diplomatic secretaries, the superior in rank sometimes being designated Counselor. To this mission are frequently attached representatives of the war, navy and commerce departments known as military, naval and commercial attachés.

Under the general supervision of the ambassador or minister are the

consular offices. These are usually to be found in every city of commercial importance to the country represented. They are in charge of consuls assisted by vice-consuls. The chief consular office in any area is designated a consulate-general. The officer in charge is known as a consul-general and has some degree of supervision over the work of the consulates in his area.

This form of organization is so nearly uniform in all of the five countries under discussion that individual services call for no detailed comment. The functions in the case of each country are practically parallel. Consuls, in addition to the routine duties of their offices, are expected to study and report upon commercial and business conditions and also upon political affairs. Except in the widely scattered

consulates of the Far East and in the dominions and colonies of European powers, where no diplomatic officer is stationed, American consular officers, however, devote little time to political questions as compared with the consular officers of the four European powers. Diplomatic missions, in addition to their representative duties, are especially charged with the obligation to keep the department of their government, in charge of its foreign relations, closely and accurately informed of the political trends in the country where they are stationed, particularly as these trends may affect the foreign policy of other countries.

The diplomatic and consular offices with their various attachés are actually the centers of a fairly widespread, although informal, network for the collection of information for their governments. They depend in no small degree upon their outside social and business contacts. Bankers, merchants, journalists and, particularly in the Far East, missionaries, all serve as sources of information to the diplomatic and consular officers. It is the duty of these officers to sift such information, verify it, appraise it and put it in official form for transmission to the home government. Such communications furnish the background against which the foreign office considers official communications received from foreign governments. These communications from governments, with the mass of informational communications from its representatives abroad, furnish the grist for the mills of the foreign office concerned. It is its function to work over this material and put it in shape so that, in all its bearings upon the political, economic and social interests of its own country, it may be available to the foreign minister or secretary of state. It is his function in turn to assist the chief of

the state to formulate it into specific courses of action.

It is apparent, then, that the ability and experience of the personnel in the foreign office, and the efficiency of the organization through which they operate, are always of first rate, and may at any time, become of vital importance to the welfare and even the safety of the country concerned.

THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE


The British Foreign Office is frequently referred to as "Downing Street" from the name of the diminutive street whose single block of length it shares with the Colonial Office and the residence of the Prime Minister. It is generally considered, outside of the British Empire at least, as the most efficiently organized foreign office in the world. In England itself one more frequently meets with a somewhat acrid criticism. The truth undoubtedly lies between these two extremes. There are many standards by which a foreign office may be judged and critics and apologists do not always relate their appraisements to the same standard. It may be said by way of preliminary comment that there is little in the actual organization of the British Foreign Office which is essentially different from that which is found in the foreign offices of the three other European countries covered by this survey. Whatever superiority it may have relates rather to its personnel and its tradition.

The accompanying chart outlines the structure of the organization of the British Foreign Office. It may be helpful to show it in operation. Let us assume that an important cable arrives in London from the British Consul General in Shanghai. Perhaps this cable brings the news that the Chinese Nationalist armies have defeated their opponents who were defending Shang-

hai and are now advancing upon that city. The Consul General may ask for instructions as to whether he shall join with the consuls of other powers interested in the foreign settlement in Shanghai in using such forces as are available to prevent the Nationalist troops from entering the settlement, or whether it is to be the policy of Great Britain to

depository of all the knowledge of Downing Street. It is the all inclusive memory, so far as foreign affairs are concerned, of the British government. It has its books, to be sure, it has its archives, its papers and its files. But in addition it has its staff of officers who know how to use the accumulated masses of documents. It is presided

CHART OF ORGANIZATION OF BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE



oppose no resistance to the Nationalist advance. At any rate let us assume that it is a message which requires a decision on a major matter of policy.

This communication, as soon as it is decoded, is sent to the Registry, a section of the Library. The Library is something more than a depository for books. It is in fact one of the most important administrative departments of the British Foreign Office. It is a

over by men of eminent standing as historians of international affairs, men who have had a lifelong training in research, frequently in this very office. They are assisted in their work by more than twenty officers, excluding typists.¹⁶

The officers in charge of the Library are in no sense responsible for the

¹⁶ For more detailed description see Foreign Policy Association Information Service, Vol. IV, No. 24, p. 413.

making of foreign policy. They are responsible for the accumulation of every item of information which might be useful to the officers who do make policy. Obviously, the last item to arrive is frequently the most important, but it can only be properly handled in the light of what has gone before. The British are therefore logical in having their incoming items go first to its general depository of information.

There is another reason for this however. The officers in charge of the Library and Registry know every department of the Foreign Office and are thus able to decide which department or departments are concerned with the newly arrived communication. It is their business to see that it immediately reaches those departments.

In the case of any political matter the department concerned will be one of the eight political departments of the Foreign Office. These are as follows:¹⁷

1. The American and African

This deals with all matters affecting North and South America; also includes questions affecting Liberia, the liquor traffic and the slave traffic.

2. Central

This is concerned principally with Franco-German relations, the Central European countries, and consequently, with problems arising out of the Peace Treaties.

3. Eastern

Has charge of affairs concerning Turkey, Persia and the Hedjaz.

4. Egyptian

This includes besides Egypt, the neighboring countries of the Sudan, Abyssinia and Tripoli.

5. Far Eastern

Is concerned with China, Japan, Siam, and the traffic in opium and other drugs.

6. Northern

This department deals with Soviet Russia, the Scandinavian States, including Finland, the three newly created Baltic States, Poland and Afghanistan.

7. Western, general, League of Nations

This department deals with France, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Holland, Luxemburg, Switzerland, Morocco, the New Hebrides, and matters concerning the League.

8. Dominions information

This is concerned with inter-imperial relations and questions of foreign policy affecting the Dominions.

It is in these departments that incoming information is gathered up and organized and the various possible policies with regard to particular situations first considered. The chief of the department may desire to have a statement of the precedents in similar situations, or a historical analysis of the facts in regard to some pending questions. For this he will call upon the Library, which through its research organization will furnish him with a completely documented reply to his inquiry.¹⁸ With this before him the chief of a political department is in a position to suggest the possible courses of action and to make his own recommendation as to which should be pursued.

In the case of our message from Shanghai, it would of course go to the Far Eastern Department. Under ordinary circumstances the man in charge of that Department would be of the rank of Counselor. He would have served in China or Japan, or from equivalent experience in the Foreign Office itself would be thoroughly

¹⁷ Foreign Office List, 1928, p. 10.

¹⁸ Foreign Policy Association Information Bulletin, Vol IV, No. 24, p. 464.

familiar with the background so far as the Far East was concerned. After studying the situation in the light of the suggested message, he would prepare a memorandum, or "minute," as it is called, in which he would briefly set forth the salient facts of the situation created by the advance of the Chinese Nationalist armies, outline two or three possible courses of action, recommend one of them and forward the papers to his superior.

Above the political departments and supervising their work are two Assistant Undersecretaries of State. The rank of these officers is practically equivalent to that of ministers and they have probably served either in that capacity or in posts of equal responsibility in international conferences and in the Foreign Office itself. Their experience has qualified them to take a large view of policy in any particular region and to relate it to the interests of the Empire in other parts of the world.

One of these Assistant Secretaries would receive the papers on the China matter with the minute of the chief of the Far Eastern Department. He would study it over, add any comments and opinions which his wider training and experience would seem to demand and submit it to his superior.

This is the Deputy Undersecretary of State, whose function is to correlate the policies which come up through the two Assistant Undersecretaries and, adding any minute which he deems necessary, send the documents on to the highest official of the Foreign Office, namely the Permanent Undersecretary of State.

This office is one of the most important in the British government. Its incumbent has, as a rule, spent the greater part of his life in the British diplomatic service or in the Foreign Office and may have served as Am-

bassador in one of the most important foreign posts. The office is ranked with the embassies at Washington, Paris or Berlin, as one of the highest goals of the British foreign service. The present incumbent, Sir Ronald Lindsay, entered the diplomatic service in 1898, at the age of twenty-one, and has held thirteen different posts in the course of his service.¹⁹ Before he entered upon the duties of his present office he was ambassador at Berlin. His predecessor, Sir William Tyrrell, was recently assigned as ambassador to France.

A man of such training and experience, a man who, through his ability, has made his way to the top, through the silent but nonetheless real competition, which is always going on in the British foreign service, should be qualified, as few men are, to appraise the work of the three experts who have already studied a question by the time it comes to him, and to render to his superior, the Foreign Minister, an opinion on which the latter may well find himself impelled to rely.

The only check which the Foreign Minister has upon the recommendations of his Permanent Undersecretary and staff is whatever may be afforded by the office of Parliamentary Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs. This officer is a Member of Parliament and in some sense an assistant Foreign Minister. He is chosen from the ranks of the party in power because of his interest in and experience with international affairs. He frequently responds in the House to questions addressed to the Foreign Minister. He must therefore enjoy the full confidence of the latter.

The position in the Foreign Office of the Parliamentary Undersecretary depends to a considerable extent upon the personal character of that official.

¹⁹ Foreign Office List, 1928, p. 314.

While he is the confidential adviser of the Foreign Minister and assists his chief in directing foreign policy in accordance with the trend of public opinion, he nevertheless ranks below the Permanent Undersecretary. In this matter the practice of the Foreign Office differs from that in the Colonial Office and the India Office. There the Parliamentary Undersecretary is subordinate only to the Minister. The lesser importance of his position in the Foreign Office is evidence of the high authority exercised by its Permanent Undersecretary. There results from time to time a feeling of rivalry or even of opposition between these two officials. If the Parliamentary Undersecretary is a man of aggressive character, determined to assert himself, he may render service to his chief in assisting him to shape foreign policy in harmony with the trends of public opinion, with which his political career keeps him more closely in touch than is usual with a permanent official. If, on the other hand, the Parliamentary Undersecretary is a man lacking in self-assertion, his position may easily be reduced to that of a mere mouthpiece for the Foreign Minister—and the Permanent Undersecretary—in the House of Commons.

In any case the weight of the authority of the permanent staff of the Foreign Office is enormous. It requires considerable strength of conviction on the part of a temporary holder of the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, a politician and, at best, an interested amateur in the field of world politics, to refuse to heed the counsel of a professional staff selected and organized as is that of the British Foreign Office.

Here is the chief point of criticism against that very competent organization. It is a professional staff and as we shall see later its personnel is drawn largely from the upper class families.

Its sympathies are naturally the sympathies of that class. Whether rightly or wrongly, it is open to the charge that its recommendations, in matters of foreign policy, are such as would appeal to the convictions of that class. Those recommendations, even when they prevail with the Foreign Minister, are of course subject to final review in the Cabinet. It is that body which makes the final decision on major issues of foreign policy. On the great questions, those which have aroused keen public interest, the Cabinet may, without hesitation, revise Foreign Office recommendations where it is necessary to bring them into line with public sentiment. Here, then, is an effective political check upon the supposed dangers of bureaucracy. How far it operates on the mass of questions which do not cross the threshold of public interest, is a matter on which there is room for a difference of opinion. The members of the Cabinet, like the Foreign Minister, are politicians and rarely have any intimate knowledge of foreign affairs. If they follow the recommendation of the Foreign Office, and their decision results disastrously, there is no authoritative voice to say that the disaster was not inevitable. If they refuse to be guided by the recommendations of the Foreign Office experts, and their decision results disastrously, the blame is on themselves, both for taking the action and for refusing to follow the expert advice which the nation itself has placed at their disposal.

This issue is likely to become more sharply drawn, now that the Labor Party, with its emphasis on the international as opposed to the national point of view, has become the second party in the House of Commons. It is more than likely that if the Labor Party ever secures a majority it will take steps to secure what will be, from its point of

THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY


view, a liberalizing of the attitude of the Foreign Office. This situation should be borne in mind in evaluating the criticisms of our own State Department for its non-professional character.

THE FRENCH FOREIGN OFFICE

The French Foreign Office, known as the *Quai d'Orsay* from its location

Office, let us assume that on the same day upon which the British Consul General sent his message from Shanghai to London, reporting the advance of the Chinese Nationalists, the French Consul General sent a message to Paris from the French Concession in Shanghai, reporting the same facts. His cable would go to a section of the

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on one of the most magnificent boulevards along the banks of the Seine, is perhaps the outstanding rival of the British Foreign Office, in the estimation of other countries. But in this case, too, it must be said that in the externals of organization it exhibits no startling peculiarities.

In order to parallel our examination of the working of the British Foreign

Cabinet of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

This "Cabinet" in the French Foreign Office plays a very significant rôle in the work of that organization. The *Quai d'Orsay*, like the British Foreign Office, is staffed almost entirely by professional diplomatic and consular officers. But the French have met the objection that such a professional staff

may, by the sheer weight of its knowledge and prestige, exercise too strong an influence on the Foreign Minister, by allowing the Minister his own personally appointed "Cabinet." This body has no duties similar to those of the President's Cabinet in this country. It is not a consultative group who formally advise the Minister on questions of policy. It is rather the personal office staff of the Minister. Its personnel is not appointed solely on a political basis. The Cabinet is usually made up in large part of professional diplomats, but the point is that they are chosen for these places by the Minister himself and are responsible primarily to him, rather than to the Foreign Office, as an organization. The Minister, by requiring these personal appointees to see that he is made acquainted with all of the possible courses of action recommended by the regular organization of the Foreign Office, has some check upon whatever tendencies toward bureaucracy there may be in that body. This check is not too effective because, with the passing of any particular Foreign Minister, the professional members of his Cabinet return to their status in the foreign service and again come under the administrative direction of the regular Foreign Office organization. It is not likely then that they will go too far out of their way to antagonize this organization during their brief session in the Minister's Cabinet. Nevertheless the Cabinet system, together with the ministerial responsibility to parliament, seems to operate to the satisfaction of the French in their effort to moderate any professional tendency toward bureaucracy.

The cable from Shanghai would be opened in the Minister's Cabinet. After it was decoded a number of copies would be made forthwith. One of these copies would follow a course very

similar to that we have already traced with the British Foreign Office. It would go to one of the five major sub-divisions of the Division of Political and Commercial Affairs.

These five sub-divisions follow the division of interests in French diplomacy and are as follows:²⁰

1. Europe

This, as its name indicates, deals with all the nations of Europe.

2. Asia and Oceania

This deals not only with the countries of Asia but with the colonial possessions of various powers in the Far East such as the Philippines, India and the Dutch East Indies. It also includes Australia, presumably New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands.

3. Africa and the Near East

This sub-division concerns itself with the political, commercial and financial affairs of Tunis, Morocco, the possessions of European powers in Africa and also with Egypt, Abyssinia, Liberia, Turkey, Syria, Palestine, Irak and Arabia.

4. America

This deals with all of the countries of North and South America including European possessions in this hemisphere.

5. League of Nations

In view of the very active participation of France in the League of Nations, this sub-division assumes a special political importance.

There are also to be found in the Division of Political and Commercial affairs, political sub-divisions of more general outlook, one or more of which

²⁰ *Annuaire Diplomatique et Consulaire, 1927*, p 1, *et seq.*

might be considered in matters referred to any geographical division. These are as follows:

6. A sub-division of commercial relations.

7. French culture abroad.²¹

8. Foreigners in France and international unions.

There are also in this Division the secretariat of the Director, a decoding office, a legal bureau, an administrative bureau, a filing office, and a sub-division of chancery and minor disputes, all of which where their name does not otherwise indicate, are administrative in character.

One copy of the dispatch from the Shanghai Consul General obviously goes to the sub-division on Asia. This sub-division, like the other political sub-division, is usually headed by a minister plenipotentiary.²² The sub-director may be, either a man who has had ministerial experience, or who through years of service, either abroad or in the Foreign Office, has risen to the grade of counselor of embassy and is promoted to minister of the second class upon taking over the headship of the sub-division. This generally means an experience of upwards of twenty years.²³ A sub-director is advised by

experts on the various countries which are assigned to him. With their assistance he studies the new situation disclosed by the Consul General's cable, sets forth the possible courses of action, makes his own recommendation and forwards the papers to the Director of the Division of Political and Commercial Affairs.

Meanwhile other copies of the same dispatch may have gone to the Bureau of Political and Commercial Affairs, the sub-division on Commercial Relations, the Legal Bureau, the sub-division on the League of Nations and very possibly to the sub-divisions on Europe and America. In each of these an officer, ordinarily of sufficient training and experience to have won the rank of minister of the second class or consul general, and sometimes even the rank of minister of the first class, goes over the matter with his experts and makes a minute as to the effect of possible courses of action on French political and commercial interests or relations with the League, or other powers in Europe or America, as the case may be.

All of these minutes come together in the office of the Director of the Division of Political and Commercial Affairs. He is usually a minister of the first class with upwards of a quarter of a century of diplomatic and Foreign Office experience to his credit.²⁴ He, too, has already had a copy of the Consul General's dispatch and has had some opportunity to study the question himself. With the reports of his various sub-division heads before him, he makes up a complete minute covering the matter from all points of view and forwards it to the Secretary General.

The position of the Secretary General of the French Foreign Office corresponds very closely to that of the Permanent Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Great Britain. The

²¹ NOTE—This sub-division is entrusted with the task of disseminating a knowledge of French culture and French method in other countries. Its nearest approach in this country is the work of foreign missions, the great foundations and university exchange activities—work which with us is left entirely in private hands. The French system of official guidance has been closely followed by Germany and Italy. (See *Chambre des Députés* No. 3391, *Rapport du Budget, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères*, 1926, p. 136.) The French budget of 1928 carried an appropriation of upwards of \$1,300,000 for such work. Approximately \$75,000 of this was for America, North and South. (See *Chambre des Députés*, No. 4875, *Rapport du Budget, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères*, 1927, p. 252,

²² *Annuaire Dipl. et Cons.*, 1927, p. 8.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 83 and 87.

²⁴ *Annuaire Dipl. et Cons.*, 1927, p. 83.

office is looked upon as the highest and most influential in the diplomatic career and is generally speaking the goal of the diplomatic and consular service. The incumbent enjoys the rank of ambassador and usually has served in high diplomatic posts. The present incumbent has a diplomatic and Foreign Office experience of forty years.²⁵ So great is the authority of the Secretary General that some foreign ministers have preferred not to have the office filled while they were in charge. M. Poincaré, for example, while he was Foreign Minister, got along without a Secretary General. The whole responsibility of the office, however, can hardly be combined with the responsibilities of the Foreign Minister himself. The result of M. Poincaré's elimination of the Secretary General was merely to transfer to the Director of the Division of Political and Commercial Affairs much of the authority ordinarily exercised by the Secretary General. M. Briand with all of his intimate knowledge of international politics, finds that he can use such a Secretary General to good advantage.

As the chief adviser of the Foreign Minister, the Secretary General receives the papers in the Shanghai case. He and the Foreign Minister were both furnished with copies of the original dispatch immediately upon its receipt. They may have already discussed possible courses of action, perhaps arrived at a tentative decision on policy. In extremely urgent cases they may issue instructions without waiting for the reports of their subordinates. If the China case demanded no such precipitate action, the Secretary General would go over the studies submitted to him, make up his own comment and recommendation as to the course of action to be adopted, and submit the matter to the Foreign Minister.

²⁵ *Idem.*, p. 192.

Thus in the *Quai d'Orsay*, as in Downing Street, prospective diplomatic moves are submitted to the close scrutiny of a number of men of long experience, careful training and proven ability and are submitted to the Foreign Minister illuminated by their counsel and advice. In his Cabinet the proposed courses of action are again studied by men who, while without the same professional experience as the foreign office executives, are nevertheless men of considerable diplomatic training and are qualified to consider diplomatic questions in the light of the general policy of the Foreign Minister and of the changing aspects of public opinion.

The result of these various deliberations is embodied by the Foreign Minister in a proposed course of action which he submits to the Ministry of which he is a member. Here it is subject to all of the political influences concentrated in the existing government. As in England, the Ministry may modify the Foreign Minister's proposals on major issues to bring them into line with public sentiment, but in the great mass of less conspicuous matters, the continuous pressure of the Foreign Office is likely to prevail in the end.

THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE

The German Foreign Office is located in one—or rather two—of the huge government buildings which line both sides of the Wilhelmstrasse in the heart of Berlin. While the aspect both of building and personnel are distinctively German, here again we find, in the matter of organization, a substantial similarity to that prevailing in the other offices covered by this survey. The chief difference owes its origin perhaps to the traditional German thoroughness and expresses itself in more detailed sub-division and more exten-

sive correlation than is evident in either Paris or London.

The nature of the organization, as well as its method of functioning, may again be shown by tracing the course of an incoming message. While German interests in China since the War have been much less extensive than those of England and France and while the Germans have no responsibility for the safety of a concession at Shanghai, we may assume for present purposes that the German Consul General in Shanghai, like his colleagues, advised Berlin of the advance of the Chinese Nationalist forces. Such news would evidently cause less perturbation in Wilhelmstrasse than it would on the *Quai d'Orsay* or on Downing Street, but in order to carry out our parallel, we may assume that the German response ultimately requires a decision by the Foreign Minister.

The Consul General's message would be received and decoded. As in France a number of copies would be made and at once distributed to every office which might be concerned, including the higher executives of the Foreign Office and the Foreign Minister himself. One copy, known as the "working" copy would go to the appropriate political department of the Foreign Office. Here we come at once upon the evidence of more detailed organization in Berlin. The Foreign Office is organized in eight major divisions, including the Legal and Press divisions. At the head of each is a Ministerial-director. Five of these divisions devote their attention primarily to matters of policy. The classification at present seems a bit illogical. It strikes us as strange that the Near Eastern countries should be handled in the "England-America" division and that the Philippines and Finland should be found in one division. The reason for this somewhat odd arrangement is that

the Ministerial-directors in charge have happened to have experience with those parts of the world. The assignment of countries proceeds according to the experience of the directors and shifts from time to time as the executive personnel is changed. The present divisions are as follows:

1. Europe

This division has general supervision of all matters relating to continental Europe with the exception of Russia, Poland, Scandinavia and the Baltic States.

2. This is the "England-America" division which in addition to matters pertaining to those countries has supervision of affairs relating to Abyssinia, Afghanistan, the British Dominions and Colonies, Liberia, Persia, Turkey and the American colonies exclusive of the Philippines.

3. This division handles matters relating to the rest of the world including Russia, Poland, the Baltic States and Asia, including the Philippines.

4. German culture abroad. This division devotes its attention to Germans living abroad, German cultural development and schools abroad, German art, films and sport, and matters affecting emigrants.

5. Economics, which has in addition to general matters and commercial treaties, full charge of reparations.

The work of each of the major divisions is distributed among six or eight sub-divisions known as referats. For example the England-America division has seven referats as follows:

A includes the United States, Mexico, Cuba, Haiti and Liberia.

FOREIGN OFFICE ORGANIZATION

B handles claims for the whole division.

E deals with Great Britain, her Dominions and Colonies.


MS. has charge of Central and South American relations.

O covers the Near East including Turkey, Egypt, Afghanistan and India.

again divided into political and economic bureaus.

The "working" copy of our fictitious message from Shanghai would go first to the political bureau of the China referat of division 3. Here it would be studied and minuted from the point of view of its political significance for

CHART OF ORGANIZATION OF THE GERMAN FOREIGN



R devotes its attention to the movement of raw materials from the countries covered by the division.

Sch. This is a rather special sub-division which devotes its time to the collection and analysis of evidence on the war-guilt question.

Sub-divisions A, E, MS and O are

Germany and referred to the economic bureau which would give it similar study from the point of view of German commerce and industry. It would then go to the chief of the sub-division, who is ordinarily a man with the experience and rank of a minister, either of Class 1 or 2, according to the im-

portance of the sub-division. As in the case of France, this rank would ordinarily imply upwards of twenty years of diplomatic or foreign office service. The chief of a sub-division would co-ordinate the work of his two bureaus, outline the possible courses of action and make his own recommendation in forwarding the papers to his superior the Ministerialdirector.

The Ministerialdirectors are, generally speaking, men of longer experience and more intensive training than either the Director of Political and Commercial Affairs in France or the Assistant Undersecretaries of State in England. They enjoy a rank superior to that of a minister of the 1st class and in some cases have actually served as chiefs of mission. The sub-division of political work among five of them gives them a greater advantage in the matter of attention to detail. The minute of the Ministerialdirector on the Shanghai message would therefore go to his superior with considerable authority behind it.

That superior is the State Secretary, the German equivalent of the British Permanent Undersecretary of State, and the French Secretary General. The office corresponds very closely with these two in dignity and importance. The incumbent precedes ambassadors in official rank and, as in the countries already mentioned, the post is looked upon as the highest goal of the foreign service. His minute to his Foreign Minister carries with it a weight quite as great as that of the British Permanent Undersecretary of State to his chief.

The German system seems to offer no effective check in the Foreign Office itself beyond the political convictions of the holder of the portfolio of foreign affairs, against whatever dangers there may be in a bureaucratic handling of diplomacy. Under the Empire, bu-

reaucracy was supreme. With the establishment of the Republic, the power of the ministers seems to have been sufficiently increased and made sufficiently responsible to public opinion, as represented in the Cabinet and by various groups in the Reichstag, to satisfy for the time being any demand for a further check upon bureaucratic tendencies.

THE ITALIAN FOREIGN OFFICE

The Foreign Office of the Kingdom of Italy was formerly referred to as the "Consulta." In recent years it is more popularly dubbed the "Palazzo Chigi," for it is from this palace in the heart of Rome that Signor Mussolini directs the foreign, together with all the other policies of present-day Italy. In regard to the organization of the Foreign Office, the Fascisti have not departed as far from the prevailing type as their innovations in other matters might lead one to expect.

The Italian organization in its skeletal features resembles the German more closely than that of either of the other two countries so far considered. Political affairs are grouped in two major divisions under Directors-General. These divisions are:

1. Europe and the Near East.
2. Known as the "Four As," includes America, Asia, Africa and Australia.

Two other divisions are occupied with Italian cultural work. These are:

3. Italians abroad.
4. Italian schools abroad.

The nature of these sections corresponds in a general way with the French and German Cultural divisions. Because of the very large number of Italian emigrants, however, a special division deals with their needs. The "schools abroad" division carries the

remainder of the work of Italian cultural development in foreign countries.



The major divisions are sub-divided into an appropriate number of sections and deal with the affairs of particular countries or groups of countries. There is also a bureau for handling League of

twenty as in the other foreign offices. The procedure, however, is similar. It is the duty of the chief of the section to outline the possible courses of action and to make his recommendation, based upon his own knowledge of the subject and the reports of the experts in

CHART OF ORGANIZATION OF ITALIAN FOREIGN OFFICE

Foreign Minister

Undersecretary



Nations matters and a bureau of Economic Coördination.

The head of a section is ordinarily a man of the rank of Counselor of Legation, a rank which is a step lower than that of an incumbent of a corresponding position in the other countries. It might ordinarily imply fifteen years of professional experience rather than

his section. This minute is then forwarded to the appropriate Director-General.

The Directors-General are supposed to be men of ministerial rank with a score or more of years of diplomatic service to their credit. In this they correspond to the Assistant Secretaries of State in England and to the Director

of Political and Commercial Affairs in France. They have neither the rank nor the experience of Ministerialdirectors, the corresponding officers in Germany.

In contrast to the other countries discussed, Italy has no first-rank professional diplomat at the head of her Foreign Office. The highest official is the Undersecretary, but his position is nearer that of the Parliamentary Undersecretary than that of the Permanent Undersecretary in England. He carries more of the administrative burden than his British Parliamentary confrère but probably has no greater influence on policy. The present incumbent is a former deputy and executes the instructions of the Foreign Minister, Signor Mussolini.

Neither the question of bureaucracy nor that of the modifying influence of public opinion arises under the Fascist system. The Government is admittedly in the hands of experts who conduct it for the welfare of the nation and public opinion is not expected to play such a part as it does in other countries.

THE U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

For a number of years under the Confederation we had a Secretary for Foreign Affairs, but an unusually prudent Congress felt that the mere existence of such an office might seem like an invitation to other countries to have dealings with us and, lest they accept the implied invitation, the conduct of such foreign relations as were inescapable was assigned to a "Secretary of State" whose principal duties were supposed to be of a domestic nature. We even have a Department of State instead of a Foreign Office. Except in name, the practical differences are only such as inhere in the difference between our own system of government and a parliamentary one. The Secretary of State is appointed by the Presi-

dent with the approval of the Senate. Like his chief, he continues to hold office despite an adverse vote in Congress. The conduct of foreign relations is, therefore, less subject to the immediate control of the legislature than it is in parliamentary countries where the Ministry can be ejected from office by a vote of lack of confidence or where, as in Germany, the Foreign Minister can in similar fashion be forced to resign on a question of foreign policy alone.

Another outstanding difference between our State Department and the foreign offices here discussed is probably due less to our system of government than to our general acceptance of the idea that any American is *ipso facto* qualified for any administrative or political office, an idea which we have rationalized into a distrust of bureaucracy. Few of our Secretaries of State since the early days of the Republic have been professional diplomats and there have always, until the last few years, been more political appointees than professional service men in the higher executive offices of the Department. The word "political" is here used in no invidious sense, but merely to indicate a non-professional appointee. Many of our ablest men have been among such appointees.

Nevertheless this fact markedly differentiates the State Department from the European foreign offices. In a measure it avoids the supposed dangers of bureaucracy, though the success of the country in maintaining civilian control over the army and navy would indicate that perhaps the fears of bureaucracy are exaggerated. Probably it has a tendency, for better or for worse, to keep the policies of the State Department closer to the trends of public opinion. On the other hand it has frequently placed decisions in the hands of men with all too little qualification for their work. This matter will

be discussed more fully in connection with the subject of personnel.

As to the organization of the State Department, it follows the same general lines as that of the European foreign offices. Political matters are assigned to six divisions. These divisions are as follows:²⁶

1. Far Eastern affairs. This deals not only with the countries of Eastern Asia and colonial possessions in that part of the world but has charge of matters pertaining to the control of the drug traffic.
2. Latin American affairs. This has charge of all the Latin American countries except Mexico.
3. Western European affairs. Covers the British Empire, Continental Europe with the exception of the Balkans, Russia, Poland and the Baltic States. It includes India, Liberia and Morocco.
4. Near Eastern affairs. Includes the Balkans and the countries of the Near East.
5. Mexican affairs. Deals exclusively with Mexico.
6. Eastern European affairs. Includes Russia, Poland and the Baltic States.

There is also an Economic Adviser, with a number of assistants. To him are referred all matters which may affect the economic or financial interests of the United States. He ranks with the other Chiefs of Division.

In the event of the receipt of a cablegram from our Consul General in Shanghai along the lines of those suggested in previous paragraphs, it would be decoded and sent to the Far Eastern division. The chief of such a division might be either a non-professional appointee chosen presumably for some

special knowledge of the field of that division or a Foreign Service officer with the rank of diplomatic secretary, consul-general or consul with an experience in diplomatic affairs varying from four years to eighteen or twenty years. This officer would consider the recent development in consultation with three or four men of minor diplomatic or consular rank assigned to the division. These men would ordinarily have seen some service in one of the countries covered by that division. Their assignment to the Department cannot, under existing law, extend beyond a period of four years. After this consultation the Chief of Division would forward his minute to his supervising Assistant Secretary of State. Of the four Assistant Secretaries of State, three are assigned the task, in addition to many other duties, of supervising the political work of the Department. One has charge of Europe, one of the Americas and one of Asia. These offices have all been filled by the promotion of Chiefs of Division. None of the incumbents has had ministerial or ambassadorial experience nor does the office of Assistant Secretary itself imply even ministerial rank. The present incumbents average less than fifteen years of experience in international affairs. The experience of one of them is limited to the State Department itself, a second to the diplomatic service and a third to the consular service, both of the latter with some few years of service in the Department before promotion to their present position.

The Undersecretary of State, while sharing the title, has little of the authority or standing of the Permanent Undersecretary of State in the British Foreign Office. His position in the office approaches more closely that of the Parliamentary Undersecretary. To be sure he ranks all of the other officers


²⁶ State Department Register 1929.

of the State Department and acts for the Secretary in the absence of the latter. Despite his higher rank, Congress by a curious process of reasoning

Secretary of State, although he is the superior officer.

This anomalous situation also finds expression in the actual work of the

CHART OF ORGANIZATION OF STATE DEPARTMENT



Note: The extent to which the same officers are charged with both political and administrative functions can only be suggested here. It is much more common in the Dept. of State than in any Foreign Office examined, with the possible exception of the Italian

holds him to the same salary grade as that paid to Assistant Secretaries of State. By a still more curious process, the present incumbent receives \$1000 per annum than an Assistant

Undersecretary. While he exercises a certain degree of supervision of the Department on behalf of the Secretary, he has little if any of the duty of correlating policies which is incumbent upon

the corresponding officers abroad. He may assume special direction of a particularly difficult negotiation, thus relieving one of the Assistant Secretaries, as did Mr. Olds in the case of Mexico. He may be assigned to any other special task. The office is still in the experimental stage, and so far has not greatly differentiated itself from the four Assistant Secretaryships.

Our hypothetical Chinese problem, then, might or might not be referred by the Assistant Secretary to the Undersecretary for an opinion. It might be discussed informally with him by the Secretary. Even if such matters went to the Undersecretary of State in the usual course of business, our policy, in regard to them, would be subjected to no particular pressure towards continuity or uniformity. Of the seven men who have borne the title of Undersecretary of State since the office was established in 1919, four have been civilians and three have been professional diplomats. If we add to these the four others who held the office of Counselor for the Department of State (as the Undersecretaryship was entitled from its establishment in 1909 until 1919), we add four more non-professional appointees to the list. All of the civilian Undersecretaries of State have been lawyers, and, with one exception, had had no previous experience in diplomacy, except for the forced-draught activities of the War period. The one exception, the present incumbent, served for some years as Solicitor of the Department of State.

There is no question raised here as to the ability of the men who have been appointed from civil life to the important office of Undersecretary of State. It so happens that they have all been men of high standing and those still living are numbered today among the leaders of the American Bar. Our

purpose here is simply to point out that the post has no such authority, influence or professional usefulness as characterize the corresponding positions in the European foreign offices. Even where it has been filled by professional diplomats, this is the case. The first professional incumbent had had nineteen years of diplomatic service and had served both as minister and ambassador before assuming the duties of Undersecretary. His successor had also had nineteen years of diplomatic service and had served as minister for two years. The next incumbent had had twenty years of diplomatic service, the last four of which he had served as minister. The training of these men in their professional duties corresponds very closely to that usually expected in British Assistant Undersecretaries of State or corresponding positions in European Foreign Offices. All three of the American professional incumbents of the Undersecretaryship have since taken charge of embassies, one in Rome, one in Belgium and one in Constantinople. On the departure of the last, the office was again filled by a non-professional appointee.

The office of Undersecretary has never been considered as the chief goal of our foreign service. Rather, as in the case of the Assistant Secretaryships, it is looked upon as a stepping-stone to appointment to higher posts abroad. When the office has been filled by civilians, the incumbent has had the opportunity to resist whatever tendencies towards bureaucracy might have developed in the professional staff of the State Department. There would be a good argument for making the Undersecretaryship a non-professional office with this end in view. There would also be a good argument for making it one of the highest offices in the diplomatic service to the end

that the Secretary of State might have the best expert advice to ensure a certain continuity in foreign policy. There seems no good argument for making it part of the time a civilian office and part of the time a diplomatic post of lesser importance.

Our suppositious file on the Chinese problem would then go to the Secretary with such comment as the kind of Undersecretary who happened to be in office at the time might make upon it. The Secretary, who, under our system, is seldom a man of diplomatic training or experience, is required to make a decision on the advice of a minor diplomatic or State Department official and the comment of one Assistant Undersecretary of State with some years of service to his credit but who has never carried the responsibility of even a ministerial post. From the point of view of effective diplomacy the Secretary of State is obviously at a considerable disadvantage as regards expert advice when compared with the Foreign Minister of any of the great powers of Europe. The effectiveness of our diplomacy is of course considerably enhanced by the great financial and economic power of this country, but there seems no reason other than a lack of understanding of the needs of the State Department why this greater power should not itself be handled with the same degree of skill as that employed by other countries of the first rank.

COMPARATIVE EXPERIENCE OF STAFFS


The difference in professional training and experience between the Department of State and the British and French Foreign Offices is quite apparent when that experience is measured in years of service. The British Foreign Minister has at his call 19 superior officials of the Foreign Office with a total experience of 410 years, an aver-

age of approximately 22 years. The French Foreign Minister may avail himself of the advice of 15 higher officials with a total experience of 455 years, an average of 30 years. The Secretary of State has at his disposal, the advice of 12 men with a total professional experience of 151 years, an average of 12½ years.

It is not necessary in making this comparison to give any special consideration to the idea that the British and French officials are mere placeholders who have clung to their jobs through long periods and thus accumulated years of experience at the expense of initiative and judgment. Both in Downing Street and at the *Quai d'Orsay* the high posts are the object of keen competition throughout the diplomatic services and the men who are appointed to them are in the main picked for their outstanding ability.

It is necessary, however, to make some allowance on the American side for our custom of appointing men to high State Department positions from civil life. Civil service in this country has not the attraction for young men of high quality that it has in either Britain or France. The opportunities in the professions and in commerce in America are still comparatively open and their appeal to young men of initiative is greater than that of non-political public positions. It is therefore frequently desirable, when the service of a specially well qualified man from outside can be obtained, to appoint him to one of the higher posts of the Department rather than to promote a man of less ability who is already in the service. We thus deliberately sacrifice experience for ability. In such a case of course, it does not make an accurate comparison with the European offices to rate the experience of the new appointee at zero. His previous training in law or banking or some other field

Comparison of Experience in Years of Executive Personnel in British and French Foreign Offices and Department of State



may have endowed him with an experience of the highest value to the Department of State. In the past, when international problems were comparatively simple, experience gained in other fields was easily transferred for application in diplomacy. This will still be true in the future for men trained in international banking or international law. But with the tremendously increased complexity of international politics as it presents itself today, it will be increasingly difficult to find men outside of the professional service who can readily transfer their training to the diplomatic field at anything like its par value. A fair comparison is to be found in our military history. Many of the successful generals of the Civil War had received little or no military training previous to the beginning of that struggle. In the Spanish-American War volunteer commanders rendered excellent service. By 1917, however, the technic of war had become so com-

plicated that it was hardly possible to place men without military training in posts of high command. We had our civilian generals but they were used in the staff work of finance and supply while the actual management of troops in battle was left in the hands of professional soldiers.

The same sort of process is going on in the field of international affairs and we have already reached the point where we should have men in charge of our foreign relations who combine both the requisite ability and the training of experience. A staff of amateurs, regardless of their native ability, will find themselves increasingly handicapped in dealing with highly equipped professional staffs. In the matter of the experience of his advisers, in so far as that experience can be measured by years of service, the Secretary of State is at present at a distinct disadvantage when compared with the Foreign Minister of one of the great European powers.

CHAPTER IIA

THE LAW OFFICES

THE same sort of difference which appears between American and European political organization in the foreign offices is to be found in their respective methods of handling the legal aspects of foreign policy.

The British Foreign Office has two Legal Advisers and two assistants. The head of this Department, Sir Cecil Hurst, was a prominent member of the Bar at the time he was appointed Legal Adviser of the Foreign Office in 1918. Theoretically, the Legal Adviser's office merely minutes questions referred to it by the various political divisions from a legal point of view and takes no part in the initiation or formulation of policy. As a matter of fact,

however, the Legal Adviser is one of the most important officials in the British Foreign Office. He is in constant consultation with the Foreign Minister and the Undersecretaries and is frequently called upon to take part in the more important negotiations.

In France the influence of the legal adviser is even more marked. The French legal office is composed of only three men, two of whom are professors of law at the University of Paris and are called in only on special occasions. It is upon M. Fromageot, who works in a small room without assistants, secretaries or even stenographers, that the French Foreign Office relies for legal guidance in its conduct of affairs.

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But M. Fromageot is a man who has devoted his entire life to this very matter. His influence is second only to that of the Secretary General.

In Germany the legal adviser occupies a similarly important position. Dr. Gaus, the head of the office, is to be found in every conference where matters of high policy are being decided and is frequently sent on important missions of negotiation. He has ten or twelve assistants, perhaps half of whom are occupied almost exclusively with matters pertaining to the Versailles Treaty.

In all three of these offices the legal aspect is woven into and becomes a part of the very fibre of their policy. The legal adviser is an outstanding figure in the organization of the office in some such way as the general counsel of a large corporation is in this country.

While we may take this simile from American business practice, the State Department has not adopted such a method. We have the office of Solicitor of the State Department. Its incumbent is not an officer of the State Department but an officer of the Department of Justice assigned to the Department of State. Similarly, each of the other government departments has a Solicitor assigned by the Department of Justice. These men are all on the same general salary basis and this basis is fixed without reference to the particular needs of the Department of State. It seems to be assumed that because a legal adviser for, let us say, the Interior Department, where the work is such as would be familiar to most of the hundreds of thousands of American lawyers, can be obtained for a modest stipend, therefore it is possible to secure for the same stipend a man competent to act as legal adviser to the State Department, although that office requires a knowledge of the infinite intricacies of international law

and treaty rights such as is obtained by hardly more than a score of the country's lawyers in each generation.

There have passed through the Solicitor's office several men who have obtained world wide recognition for their erudition in the field of international law. The names of John Bassett Moore, James Brown Scott and Charles Cheney Hyde come to mind. But so far, under the conditions surrounding the Solicitor's office, it has been impossible to retain such men in the public service. It has frequently been necessary to seek their successors within the somewhat restricted area of the Solicitor's office itself and to promote to the headship of the office men whose sole training has been in subordinate positions.

To be sure, as far as quantity goes, we are more favored than any of the European foreign offices. For our Solicitor has twenty-two assistants. This unusually large staff in itself creates tendencies which may not be altogether helpful. It is customary to have the approval of the Solicitor's office on every important paper which goes out. This is also the case in England and Germany, but a much smaller number of men manage to handle a volume of business which must be nearly as great as that in the State Department. It is conceivable that, where a Hurst, or a Fromageot, or a Gaus, would glance over a paper and from the great resources of his own knowledge make a suggestion or give it approval, one of a score of Solicitor's assistants, whose training has been largely of a clerical nature, would spend hours digging into books to fortify his meagre assurance with precedents and citations. Such a method might readily and all unintentionally, even unwittingly, lead to obstructive rather than constructive comments from the Solicitor's office.

It should be said in the discussion of the legal aspect of foreign policy that in the case of the five governments covered by this survey the State Department or foreign office from time to time calls upon the Attorney General or the corresponding legal officers of the other governments for an opinion in special matters. The governments other than the United States, however, have not found this a sufficient substitute for having the best obtainable legal counsel in the foreign office itself.

Another point on which this difference in organization makes itself felt is in the handling of special matters such as international conferences, special commissions, arbitration claims and all

boundary disputes. In the four European countries it is customary for these matters to be handled by members of the Foreign Office staff especially assigned to that duty. It is only on rare occasions that a special representative is appointed to act in such matters. The State Department, however, frequently finds it necessary to appoint special representatives, particularly in more important matters. For example, the delegation to the Sixth Pan American Conference at Havana in 1928 was headed by a special representative, Mr. Hughes, and only three out of the eight remaining delegates were State Department or diplomatic officers.

CHAPTER II B

ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION

WE have spoken so far principally of the organization of foreign offices for the formulation of policy. This of course is the chief function of a foreign office and yet it involves a large amount of administrative work which should be handled by other officers who have little or nothing to do with the actual making of policy. Here again there are methods employed in the European Foreign Offices which may furnish useful suggestions for our own State Department. It should be understood, however, that the matter of administration is hardly likely to receive the attention in any foreign office that is given to questions of policy. Neither a Foreign Minister nor a Secretary of State is ordinarily chosen for his organizing ability nor for his interest in administrative affairs. Methods of administration are therefore likely to come into being by spontaneous growth and perpetuate themselves in a biological manner until some one of the higher executives is

distracted from the more interesting field of foreign policy to make a change. While it is altogether probable that if a Secretary of State should ever be enabled to give real attention to the administrative organization of the State Department he would raise havoc with the present patchwork and would doubtless devise a system which would be quite adequate to the needs of the Department, it may nevertheless be of interest to compare our present organization with that of the European powers.

ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENTS OF THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE

The administrative departments of the British Foreign Office are as follows:²⁷

Assistant Marshal of the Diplomatic Corps: Protocol.

Treaty. Which has charge of all treaties, conventions, the issuance of credentials, orders, rewards, questions of ceremonial and protocol, naturaliza-

²⁷ Foreign Office List, 1928, p. 10, *et seq.* See diagram on page 8.

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tion, extraditions and deportations, and passport control.

Passport office.

Chief Clerk's office. Which has charge of estimates, accounts, salaries and pensions and of the establishment.

Communications.

Consular. Which works in connection with the Department of Overseas Trade.

Library. Which, in addition to the activities already mentioned, has the usual duties in connection with the custody of books, manuscripts, archives, confidential papers, treaties, etc. This Department also publishes parliamentary and other papers.

Registry. A subsection of the Library, which, in addition to distributing incoming communications, has charge of the registering, arranging and indexing of correspondence.

THE DEPARTMENT OF OVERSEAS TRADE

In the United States, we have a complete consular organization in the State Department and a large staff of commercial attachés in the Commercial Department. Under a single administration the work of these two corps might be so divided that they would supplement each other's efforts in rendering efficient service to the country. With the existing divided administration the line of demarcation is not clear. There is much duplication of effort and frequently a spirit of competition which confuses and antagonizes the officials of foreign governments. No little illfeeling exists between the members of the two services.

In Great Britain this problem has been met by the establishment of the Department of Overseas Trade under the joint administration of the Foreign Office and the Board of Trade. The Board of Trade performs the services assigned to the Commerce Department

in this country. The Department of Overseas Trade has replaced the system of commercial attachés by a Commercial Diplomatic Service. This Service comprises three grades, that of Commercial Counselor with a salary of \$8500 a year and a representation and rent allowance of \$2750; that of Commercial Secretary, Grade 1, at a salary of \$6000 and the same allowances; and that of Commercial Secretary, Grade 2, at a salary of \$4000 to \$5000 a year with representation and rent allowances of \$2250. The administration of the Consular Service is also under the direction of the Department of Overseas Trade. This unified administration results in a much better coördination of the work of the commercial diplomatic officers and the consular officers than has yet been attained in our system of two distinct services.

ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENTS OF THE FRENCH FOREIGN OFFICE

The French have their administrative work neatly blocked off into five divisions, as follows:²⁸

1. Protocol, which has to do with all matters of ceremonial.
2. Personnel and accounts.
3. Secretariat or chief clerk's office.
4. Archives.
5. Maintenance of offices and equipment.

ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENTS OF THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE

The Germans likewise have their administrative departments neatly set off under the general supervision of a Ministerialdirector:²⁹

1. Protocol.
2. Personnel and budget.
3. Salaries and accounting.
4. Government buildings.

²⁸ *Annuaire Diplomatique et Consulaire 1927*, p. i, *et seq*. See diagram on page 12

²⁹ See diagram, p. 17.

5. Ministerial office director or chief clerk's office.
6. German affairs.

This office deals with the representatives of the various German States, still to be found in Berlin as in the time when these States retained some measure of individual sovereignty within the German Empire and were represented at Berlin by Ministers.

ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENTS OF THE ITALIAN FOREIGN OFFICE

In Italy there is one large administrative division under the control of a Director General. It includes three special sections as follows:³⁰

1. Personnel.
2. Protocol.
3. Administration.

There is also a Treaty section under the supervision of the Undersecretary.

ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE OF THE U. S.

The Department of State, besides its executive offices and political divisions,

has the following bureaus, offices and divisions:³¹

1. Office of the chief clerk and administrative assistant.
2. Foreign service personnel board (composed of three Assistant Secretaries).
3. Treaty division.
4. Passport division.
5. Division of publications.
6. Division of foreign administration.
7. Bureau of indexes and archives.
8. Bureau of accounts.
9. Visa office.
10. Office of coördination and review.
11. Foreign service buildings office.
12. Disbursing office.

The chief items of interest in these listings so far as the United States is concerned are the matters of personnel and the budget. These will therefore be examined more at length in the succeeding pages.

CHAPTER III

PERSONNEL

IT is generally accepted that no organization, however cleverly devised, can run itself. In the last analysis the effectiveness of an organization must depend largely on the men who operate it. It may be of special interest, then, to know how the personnel of the European Foreign Offices is recruited and trained and under what system they are promoted.

BRITISH PERSONNEL

Before the World War a man who was successful in his effort to enter the British foreign service was required to

serve for two years as an attaché without pay. An independent income of at least \$2000 a year was a prerequisite to admission and the salary scale was related to this requirement. As a result of the work of a Parliamentary Commission of Enquiry which filed its final report just before the War, this system with its obvious restriction of the diplomatic service to the sons of the wealthy families was done away with.³² The income qualification was

³¹ State Department Register, 1929, p. i, *et seq.* See diagram on p. 22.

³² See Foreign Policy Association Information Service, Vol. IV, No. 24, for detailed study of British Foreign Office.

³⁰ See diagram, page 19.

abolished and likewise the unsalaried attachés. The salaries of secretaries were increased and free rents and representation funds were allowed.³³

In considering the personnel of the British service, therefore, it must be borne in mind that the older members of the service, the ones who now hold the responsible positions at home and abroad are the product of an aristocratic tradition in the foreign service. It is also a subject of remark that many of the high officials are Catholics, but no particular political significance appears to be attached to this fact.

Up to 1921 the Foreign Office and the Diplomatic service were separate organizations each with its own personnel. In that year, however, they were combined into one service, members of which may be called upon for service either at home or abroad. The consular service is still a separate organization.³⁴ As a result of this amalgamation, the remarks which apply to the British diplomatic service also apply to the personnel of the Foreign Office except in so far as the older officers received their training in the separate services. Practically all of the older members of the British foreign service are graduates of Oxford or Cambridge. Between the years 1908 and 1913, 67 per cent of the successful candidates for the service came from Eton, the most aristocratic of the English public schools, while the remainder had attended such famous schools as Winchester, Rugby and Harrow.

Since the post-war changes in the method of admission to the foreign service the predominance of Eton has declined. Between 1923 and 1927 there were twenty-three candidates admitted. Eton contributed three, Harrow three, Wellington three. The others came from other of the more

expensive public schools. And all of the candidates were graduates of Oxford or Cambridge. This would indicate that the post-war reforms have had no marked effect upon the class of men entering the British foreign service.³⁵

The Board of Selection for the diplomatic and Foreign Office service is presided over by the First Civil Service Commissioner and includes several representatives of the Foreign Office and several non-official members. Candidates of at least nineteen years of age, may appear before this Board for a sort of preliminary estimate. Of these candidates a certain number are designated to take the oral examination after they have reached the age of twenty-two. Out of 243 applications during the last five years 155 were appointed to take the oral examination.

This oral examination is a very important part of the procedure. It is given by a special Board designated by the Board of Selection. The examination includes, of course, an estimate of the candidate's personality and as it allocates 300 credits out of a possible 1900, an unfavorable impression here counts heavily against the candidate, though he may possibly make up for his deficiencies here by specially creditable work in the written examination which follows. This includes the following subjects with credits shown in parenthesis:

Essay . . .	(100)
English . . .	(100)
Present-day . . .	(100)
Science . . .	(100)
Auxiliary language . . .	(100)
European history . . .	(200)
French . . .	(250)

In addition to this the candidate may choose from a wide range of other subjects valued at 100 to 200 credits

³³ Foreign Office List, 1928, p. 116.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 82 Cf. pp. 97, et seq., herein.

³⁵ Foreign Policy Association Information Service, Vol. IV, No. 24, p. 472.

in the fields of history, economics, politics, law, philosophy, mathematics, science, English literature, languages and civilization.³⁶

It will be noted that the examination is directed more to the general cultural attainments of the applicant than to his specific knowledge of the technical details of diplomacy. The questions are so framed as to test a man's general intellectual qualities, his reasoning power and judgment rather than his memory. There is practically no possibility of "cramming" for the examination and while there is no requirement that the candidate be a university graduate it is so difficult for a man without a university training to pass the examination that practically all of the successful candidates are university graduates.

The examinations are prepared by the British Civil Service Commission with the aid of university professors who are also called upon to mark the papers. This is supposed to insure a broader test than would be likely to be given in an examination prepared entirely by Foreign Office officials.

The language test is particularly severe in its nature, so much so that it is customary for prospective candidates to spend several years abroad before attempting it. The practical effect of this severity is to restrict admission to the service to the sons of those families who can afford the best public schools at home and the added luxury of study abroad. This further weakens whatever intent there may have been in the post-war changes to broaden the social basis of the British diplomatic service.

FRENCH PERSONNEL

In France the foreign service includes both diplomatic and consular

officials and the Foreign Office is manned by diplomatic and consular officials. It is a custom rarely broken to reserve all of the posts in the Foreign Office for members of the professional service. At the present time only one important office is held by an outsider.

Formerly the French diplomatic service was recruited almost entirely from the nobility and the wealthy families. This tradition has carried over to some extent but at present the personnel is generally recruited from the upper middle class with a sprinkling of the sons of the newly rich. This is explained on the ground that the plight of the intellectual classes in France is a somewhat sorry one. The franc has depreciated to one-fifth of its former value while professional incomes have increased only about three times. Thus only families of considerable means are able to send their sons to the school, a training in which is almost a prerequisite to entrance into the French diplomatic service. Stress is also laid upon an increasing interference by politicians in the matter of appointments and assignments, an interference which produces a certain *malaise* in the minds of the better qualified men in the service.

The French training school is the *École Libre des Sciences Politiques*. This school conducts courses designed to prepare students for public office, especially in connection with international affairs or the colonies and for positions in organizations engaged in foreign trade. Many of these courses are given by high officials in the departments chiefly interested, so that the school has a semi-official character. While attendance involves a certain amount of expense it has none of the character of the aristocratic public school in England.

A board of examiners is constituted

³⁶ Foreign Policy Association Information Service, Vol. IV, No. 24, p. 469.

in the Foreign Office itself for the examination of applicants. This examination is partly oral and partly written. There have been about forty applicants each year of whom no more than half successfully pass the examination. Even this number is now decreasing as the staff is recovering from the war depletion. The successful candidates are about equally divided between the diplomatic and the consular branches. The examinations are not nearly as severe as in England and the opportunity for able men to be accepted is not so dependent upon a university career and other higher educational advantages. Successful candidates in most cases, however, have either the bachelor's degree from a university or are graduates of the *École Libre* or the higher schools in law, commerce or politics. The average age on admission is between 25 and 26 years.

GERMAN PERSONNEL

In Germany, curiously enough, there is no law governing the German diplomatic service. It rests entirely on administrative orders which are subject to change at any time. The law governing the consular service dates back to 1870 but as this leaves wide discretion in the question of personnel, this service, too, has been largely subject to administrative orders. Since the War the two services have been combined and as the Foreign Office is staffed by foreign service officers, Germany, like France, has a completely unified administration of personnel.

In the old diplomatic service the compensation was nominal and diplomatic positions were deliberately reserved for men of wealth and usually of title. Since the War the salaries have been raised in both the diplomatic and consular branches of the service. The

career is now open to able men of any class, though the man without private means finds it difficult to keep his expenses within his income. The aristocratic tradition still holds to the extent that there is a strong desire on the part of men of the old titled families to send their sons into the diplomatic service. But in order to do so they must meet the competition of men of other classes except in so far as they are favored by political pull, still a matter of considerable importance.

The competition itself requires the passing of several difficult examinations and making good during a period of trial. The requirements are somewhat exacting. A candidate must have completed a college course, must have a knowledge of French and English such as can ordinarily be gained only in countries where those languages are spoken, must pass a physical examination and demonstrate his fitness for service, even in tropical countries. In a circular of suggestions for prospective candidates the Foreign Office outlines many additional qualifications. The candidate must have certain personal qualities and abilities such as the "art of handling people, power of observation, the ability to adopt the methods of thought of foreign nations, a sense of political and economic events in other countries as well as an impressive personal address." Beside French and German a third language is very desirable and candidates are encouraged to study the languages of small nations by the suggestion that this will enable them the earlier to secure a position abroad. A certain amount of legal knowledge, especially in commercial and marine law, is required. Emphasis is placed on economics and modern history. It is "especially desirable" that the candidate shall have been "engaged in some practicable business." This lat-

ter may be obtained in some of the national organizations for foreign trade, chambers of agriculture or commerce or similar organizations, but such experience is only of use "if it offers a real insight into the authoritative trains of thought and the reasoning of the managers of the business in question." The candidate must also be a competent typist and, if possible, familiar with shorthand.

It would seem unnecessary, after outlining these requirements, to prescribe that the candidate should be at least 24 years old, but all applicants must be of that age and not over 30. It is rather surprising to learn that the number of applicants each year is between 200 and 250. It is not so surprising to learn that only 30 to 40 of these are selected to take the first examination.

The Examination Committee for the German foreign service is composed of not more than 24 members. This Committee acts in the capacity of adviser and judge in all matters regarding the training of candidates for the foreign service. From the members of the Examination Committee a Select Commission is formed for each examination. This Select Commission is composed of:

1. The Reichs Minister for Foreign Affairs or a representative appointed by him (usually the State-Secretary) as chairman.

2. One member for the subject of modern history.

3. One member for the subject of political economy.

4. One member who is active in practical economic life.

- 5, 6, 7. The chairman of the administrative board of the foreign trade branch of the Foreign Office has the right to propose three persons out of this board as members of the examination committee:

8. One member for the subject of the science of law.

9. Two members as representatives of the personnel division of the Foreign Office.

Each member of the Examination Committee serves on a Select Commission at least once during his term of office. The unofficial members receive appropriate remuneration for their services and for travelling expenses if they do not live in Berlin.

The thirty or forty chosen candidates are subjected to a preliminary test in French and English which is partly written and partly oral. This test must be satisfactorily passed before the applicant can proceed. Those who pass are then subjected to a further examination, partly written and partly oral, in history, economics and law. Certain themes are assigned by the Chairman of the Examination Committee and a thesis on each of two themes must be handed in within four weeks after the student receives the subject. A third thesis must be handed in within one week from the time the subject is received. The candidate is required to make an oath that the theses were written without outside aid. He must submit a bibliography of the books used. These theses are graded by each member of the Select Commission. If two of the three are marked "unsatisfactory" the applicant may try again. If all are "unsatisfactory" the first time, or if the two repeated themes are "unsatisfactory," the applicant is dropped for that examination. An oral examination is then held before the Select Commission, and the candidates are not only examined as to their knowledge but their character and bearing are also appraised. Each candidate is graded as "excellent," "good," "passing" or "unsatisfactory" by vote of the Commission. A candidate failing in the

oral examination may repeat it six months later, but if he fails then, he is dropped.

The fortunate few who pass this grilling test are given a certificate to that effect, but even then they are not assured of appointment to the foreign service. These appointments are made from the list of those who have passed the examination as the needs of the service require. Only about fifteen enter each year, as vacancies occurring through death, resignation and enlargement of the service seldom exceed this number.

An accepted candidate is appointed "office attaché." He receives a small allowance during the ensuing three years, which are considered as years of apprenticeship. He may be employed in the Foreign Office itself or, where opportunity offers, may be sent abroad. His activities are varied as much as possible in order that he may familiarize himself with the many forms of work in the service. After this probationary period, he enters a two-semester training course in the Foreign Office. Here he studies history, politics, economics, international law and diplomatic documents. At the close of this course he must submit to a further examination in which his progress during his four years of service is tested. If he is successful in passing this test he becomes eligible for appointment to a diplomatic or consular post.

It will be seen that the Germans are, on paper at least, much more thorough than the others in their method of selection and training candidates for their foreign service. The financial arrangements add to the difficulties of a candidate without considerable personal means. The fact that successful candidates are placed on availability lists from which selections for appointments are made, opens the way for political influence. This influence is

not only personal but also partisan, each party striving to keep its proportion of members in the service. The net result is a service which compares very favorably with either the French or the English, but makes no special claims to superiority.

ITALIAN PERSONNEL

The Italian Foreign Office is staffed mainly from the unified foreign service. The Undersecretary, legal officers and certain Councillors of State who serve in an advisory capacity are outsiders. There are also non-professional accountants, interpreters and clerks. All others, especially all the officers who deal with policy, are members of the diplomatic and consular service.

To enter the career, a candidate must be a graduate of a university in law, economics or political science. While a private income is no longer a prerequisite to entrance, a successful candidate is required to serve a year without pay as a "volunteer." This, together with the educational qualifications, effectively limits the applicants to the upper middle class. While there is no requirement that a member of the foreign service shall be a member of the Fascist party, Fascist buttons are plentiful and it is probable that the service includes few men not in sympathy with the Fascist aims.

A careful investigation is first made of the character and reputation of all applicants. The report of the investigators is probably sufficient to exclude any lack of enthusiasm for Fascism. The accepted candidates are then summoned to Rome for written examination.³⁷ Elaborate precautions are taken to prevent cheating or favoritism in the examination. As the candidate enters the examination room he is

³⁷ *Ministers Degli Affari Esteri. Programma per gli esami di concorso alla carriera diplomatica e consolare. 1928.*

handed his questions for that day. He does not know until then whether it will be in history, international law, economics, French, English or German. When a paper is completed it is handed in, not under a name but under a number, so that the men who grade it do not know whose paper it is. Those who successfully pass the written examination are subjected to an oral examination two months later. The average age of admission to the service, is between 26 and 27 years.

Beginners in the service, with rare exceptions, are assigned to consular offices as assistants. After three or four years, they become vice-consuls of the second class.

PERSONNEL IN THE UNITED STATES

Under the Rogers Act of 1924 the diplomatic and consular Services of the United States were combined into one Foreign Service. Members of this Service are commissioned as Foreign Service officers and then assigned to diplomatic or consular posts as the needs of the service may require. It is also possible under the law to assign Foreign Service officers to the Department of State but such assignment must not continue for more than four years.³⁸ Except for officers so assigned, the Department of State has its own staff distinct from the Foreign Service. It is recruited in three different ways, making, with the Foreign Service officers, four kinds of positions in the Department.

1. The executive officers, including the Undersecretary and the Assistant Secretaries, are political appointees. No law prohibits the treatment of these "plums" as a part of the legitimate spoils of victory in elections and the appointment to these important posts of the old type of "office seeker." However, various influences militate

against such appointments. In the first place, the work is exacting and demands a knowledge of international affairs with which the average politician is seldom even acquainted. Second, the opportunities for political contacts and the usual manipulation of machine politics are almost non-existent. Third, the salaries paid have been so low as to offer little inducement to men who were at all qualified to undertake the work. Fourth, tradition has brought to the office of Secretary of State a high type of man. Even, though, as in the case of Mr. Bryan, he might be eager to use distant posts to reward "deserving" politicians, such a man would not care to place incompetents in the very offices upon which he himself must depend to make a success of his own incumbency.

As a result of these restraining influences, the men who have filled the executive offices of the State Department have shown a high average of ability and devotion to the public service. In recent years there has been an increasing tendency to fill these offices by appointment from the higher grades of the Foreign Service or to appoint men of some years of service in the State Department itself. The variations in the character of the office of Undersecretary have already been discussed.³⁹ Of the four present Assistant Secretaries, one has spent 34 years in the Department itself, the second is a former drafting officer with 9 years service in the Department, the third is a diplomatic officer of 13 years experience and the fourth is a former Consul General who has served for 21 years either abroad or in the Department.⁴⁰

2. In addition to these offices, Congress has authorized the appointment of "drafting officers." Originally these men were supposed to be experts in the

³⁸ Act of May 24, 1924, Sec. 14.

³⁹ See pp 21, 22.

⁴⁰ Register of the State Department.

drafting of treaties or other diplomatic documents. In practice, however, Secretaries of State have found it necessary to use these appointments to fill executive and administrative offices of considerable responsibility, using such appointees as chiefs of political or administrative divisions. Since 1924 there have been between 40 and 50 such officers in the service. This has been due to the fact that sufficient posts with adequate salaries have never been provided in the Department to enable it to secure a regular staff of executive officers.⁴¹

3. For the same reason the Secretary of State is constantly compelled to call to Washington diplomatic and consular officers to assume posts of responsibility in the Department. During the past few years there have been more than fifty such officers always on duty in Washington. This has the advantage of familiarizing Foreign Service officers with the work of the Department, but it robs the field of many of its ablest men and leaves numerous legations and even some embassies shorthanded.⁴² As it is provided by law that these men shall not remain on such duty for more than four years, it also brings about a much too frequent change in the administration of the various sections of the Department. The resulting loss of continuity is one of the most serious problems in this connection.

Foreign Service officers are at present recruited under the provisions of an Executive Order of June 7, 1924. A written examination is given in 12

cities located in various parts of the country, as well as in Washington. Those who are successful in passing the written test are notified of a date on which they may, if they so desire, appear in Washington to complete the examination by taking oral tests and the physical examination. "The moral character, integrity, good deportment and ability of the applicant" must be attested by letters from "competent and responsible persons." An applicant must state whether he has any outstanding financial obligations and if so the nature and extent thereof. Any American citizen between the ages of 21 and 35 who can comply with these requirements is eligible for examination.⁴³

The Board of Examiners is constituted by Executive Order. It is composed of the Undersecretary of State, two Assistant Secretaries of State, the chairman of the Executive Committee of the Foreign Service Personnel Board and the chief examiner of the Civil Service Commission or such person as may be designated by him to serve in his stead.⁴⁴

The written examination covers international, maritime and commercial law, arithmetic, French, German or Spanish, natural and industrial resources and commerce of the United States, political economy, political and commercial geography, American history, government and institutions, the history since 1850 of Europe, Latin America and the Far East. The examinations bear every evidence of being made out by officials in the State Department and are designed to test the technical equipment of the candidates for the work of a consular or diplomatic officer.⁴⁵ They are almost vocational in character. There is none of the effort

⁴¹ See Foreign Policy Association Information Service, Vol IV, Spcl. Suppt No 3, by William T. Stone, for detailed study of State Department administration

⁴² The Foreign Service at present needs 122 additional officers to perform its own functions properly Hearings before House Subcommittee on Appropriations for State Department 1928, p. 8

⁴³ American Foreign Service, *passim*.

⁴⁴ Executive Order, June 7, 1924, Sec. 12.

⁴⁵ American Foreign Service, 1927, p. 34.

made by the British examination to draw out the general educational qualifications of the applicant and little to test his reasoning power and judgment rather than his memory. Of the 152 candidates admitted to date under the Rogers Act, 123 are college or university graduates. The number of candidates for admission averages 140 per annum. Of these an average of 40 each year pass the examination and are placed upon an eligibility list.⁴⁶ Appointments to the Service are made from this list, beginning with the candidate who has the highest rating regardless of any priority in eligibility. If a candidate is not appointed to office within two years his name is dropped from the list. So great is the need for officers, however, that in practice, all successful candidates have been offered appointments within a year.

Newly appointed officers are supposed to be instructed in the Foreign Service School for a period of one year. This School is under a Board consisting of the Undersecretary of State, two Assistant Secretaries of State, the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Foreign Service Personnel Board and the chief instructor of the Foreign Service School.⁴⁷ This chief instructor is selected by the other members of the Board from the officers of the Foreign Service with the approval of the Secretary of State. Other instructors are selected from among officers of the Department, the Foreign Service or other executive departments of the Government and occasionally from outside the public service altogether. The period of instruction is considered a period of probation for the new appointee and if he does not show sufficient capacity he may be dropped from the service at the end of the term. There has been considerable doubt ex-

pressed as to the value of the Foreign Service School and it seems not to be functioning effectively at present.

It is the opinion of the more experienced officers in the Department and the Foreign Service that the recruits entering the service, since the passing of the Rogers Act, have been better qualified than those who entered under previous regulations. This augurs well for the future of the Foreign Service but, as the Rogers Act has been in force less than five years, none of this new personnel is likely to reach positions of high importance for at least a decade to come. Meantime the higher grades of the Foreign Service are filled by the men who were members of the diplomatic and consular services before the Rogers Act went into effect. It was the recognition of certain deficiencies in the old personnel that led to the passing of the Rogers Act. While there has been some weeding out, the operation of that Act has been such as to give the members of the older service, especially of the diplomatic service, a monopoly of the higher positions in the Foreign Service. By limiting the age of entrance into the Foreign Service to 35 years and closing all but the lower grades to such entrants, the law protects the present personnel from all outside competition. The necessity of calling many of these men to responsible positions in the State Department itself and the pressure toward the appointment of professional diplomats as chiefs of mission has resulted in an over-extension of available ability in the upper grades of the Foreign Service.

4. The remaining personnel of the State Department is recruited under the general civil service examinations, which supply clerical and minor official help to all government departments. While the educational requirements for these posts are sufficiently

⁴⁶ American Foreign Service, 1927, p. 8.

⁴⁷ Executive Order, June 7,

strict to secure a very competent clerical personnel, they are not such as to provide the sort of material which will in the course of time develop high executive capacity. Few indeed of the higher officials of the Department, and practically none in the field of policy making, have come from this section of the personnel.

It appears then that while admission to the Foreign Service has been so regulated as to secure recruits of fair ability, the staffing of the State Department, even though the number of purely political appointees has been reduced almost to the vanishing point,

is still a matter of makeshift. Non-professional and drafting officers are under one set of regulations, Foreign Service officers under another, and Civil Service employees under a third. A half-dozen administrative bodies struggle for their control. Salaries, promotions, appointments and all the other vital things in the lives of the personnel hang on the outcome of these struggles. An arrangement more destructive of morale could hardly be devised.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ Mr Stone's study should be read in this connection Foreign Policy Association Information Service, Vol IV, Suppt No 3 See also p 54

CHAPTER IV

PROMOTIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS

THE question of promotion is a delicate one in any graded service. If promotion is made purely on the basis of seniority, the organization soon loses all *esprit* and becomes an aggregation of place holders. So unsatisfactory is this system that it has been generally discarded by governments. The alternative is promotion on the basis of meritorious service. Theoretically this introduces a healthy element of intra-service competition, keeps the personnel keyed up to its best efforts and results in the gradual rise of the best qualified men to the highest positions. If there were some law of gravitation by which men of greater ability would invariably and inexorably be sent to the top, practice might coincide with theory. Unfortunately there is no such law and promotion on the merit system involves the very human factor of estimating relative merit. This human factor intrudes both with those doing the promoting and those who are promoted—or who fail to be promoted.

This injection of the fallible human element into the system of promotion has caused governmental authorities in different countries to devise various means of neutralizing it and giving their promotion systems as much as possible of the accuracy of a scientifically operating machine. The pendulum of experiment seems to swing back and forth from a commission of several members who are supposed to neutralize each others' prejudices and share the responsibility, to a dictatorship of one man, who, it is hoped, will keep his prejudices within reasonable bounds because of the concentration of responsibility.

The State Department has tried both methods and in each case heretofore the rising waves of complaint have finally swept away the existing promotion system and a new one has been installed to be tested in its turn.

Whatever method there may be in vogue in the European Foreign Offices which were examined, there seemed to be less criticism of the promoting au-

thority than with us. There was a prevalent feeling that each man in the service was obtaining a reasonably fair deal, which, regrettable as it may be, seems to offer a contrast to the situation in this country.

As already suggested, this is undoubtedly due more to the difficulty of the problem itself than to any lack of desire on the part of the Department to put the matter of promotions and assignments into some hands where it would cease to plague the other officials of the Department. Some idea of the difficulty of the task may be obtained by comparing it with our own military service. It is common knowledge that army officers feel that promotion is too slow and that even after two or three decades of faithful and efficient service there are not sufficient front-rank posts to reward all the candidates according to their expectations. If this is true in the army, where there are 12,000 officers, how much more true must it be with the slower movement in the Foreign Service whose personnel numbers less than 700.

The United States at present maintains only fourteen embassies and thirty-nine legations. While the idea of promoting experienced Foreign Service officers to be chiefs of these missions is gaining ground, the United States is hardly ready to follow the very general European practice of filling practically all foreign posts with professional diplomats. The element of politics, long very potent in our service, retains some of its momentum and men may still be named as ambassadors on the basis of somewhat indefinite personal qualifications and very definite campaign contributions. Less ambitious contributors may occasionally be satisfied with an appointment as minister.

But it is not the political element in the situation which warrants holding ambassadorial and ministerial appoint-

ments open to non-career men. Our social organization is so constructed that the great majority of our ablest minds have gone into commerce, industry, banking, or the professions. Very frequently the delicacy and importance of some diplomatic task demands a man of the highest calibre, a man such as, under present conditions, the Foreign Service would hardly produce. Keeping the higher positions open for the appointment of non-career men not only enables the government on occasion to secure the services of an outstanding man whose lack of technical training is far outweighed by his proven abilities in other lines, but also, by subjecting the career officers to such outside competition, keeps them spurred to the fullest measure of effectiveness.

Nonetheless the use of non-career men in higher diplomatic posts does decrease the number of high posts available for the men coming up from the lower grades of the Foreign Service. Of the fourteen ambassadorships, only four are now held by men promoted from the ranks of the Foreign Service. Of the thirty-nine legations, only sixteen are headed by Foreign Service appointees.⁴⁹ The fifty-nine consulates-general, though they are all filled by career men, do not seem to offer sufficient pay and prestige to satisfy the normal desires of the ever-advancing ranks of Foreign Service officers.

While some of these factors are peculiar to the United States service because the elasticity of our social system has tended to make men less contented to stop at anything short of the front rank, nevertheless some of these problems of promotion have presented themselves to the foreign offices of Europe and their methods of handling them may offer some suggestions of value for us.

⁴⁹ Register of the State Department, 1928.

Closely allied to the question of promotion is that of assignment. Three officers of the same rank and, let us say, the same ability, are to be assigned to three different posts. There may be a vacancy in one of the political divisions of the State Department, another in one of the foremost European capitals under the supervision of an ambassador who is known to be in high political favor with the Administration, and a third may be in some native village on the coast of Africa. Whatever authority assigns the three candidates to those three positions is fortunate indeed if no complaint is registered from at least one of these officers. Assignment to this or that post, aside from being a matter of very considerable importance in the life of the appointee and his family, may also include an opportunity or a lack of opportunity to win promotion. The two matters are closely related and are usually handled by the same authority.

PROMOTION AND ASSIGNMENT IN THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE

In the British service the candidate who passes the entrance examination with the highest credit is entitled to appointment to the first vacancy in the service. He is commissioned as Third Secretary. For two years he is considered to be on probation. If he survives these two years he serves for three more years as Third Secretary, when he practically automatically becomes a Second Secretary. From that rank he can pass to the grade of First Secretary only as vacancies in that grade occur. Such vacancies are usually filled by promotion from the ranks of the Second Secretaries on the basis of seniority but "suitability" is also a factor.⁵⁰

Above the rank of First Secretary is

that of Counselor. In promoting men to this grade seniority is no longer the determining factor. Counselors are supposedly appointed because of their merit. The method of determining the degree of merit necessary for a promotion, however, is not such as would appeal to public servants in this country. The British Foreign Office keeps no detailed efficiency records nor is there any method by which an attempt is made to introduce regularity and equality into the estimate of the candidates for promotion. It is simply the "general impression" that a man has made upon his superiors during the years of service in the three lower grades.

This "general impression" cannot be made upon the Foreign Minister himself, because his acquaintance with the personnel of the service is naturally somewhat limited. The Permanent Undersecretary has more opportunity, but even he has neither time nor incentive to delve very deeply into the qualifications and abilities of several hundred minor officials with most of whom he seldom if ever comes in contact. In practice the matter of recommendations for promotion gravitated to the private secretaries of the Foreign Minister and of the Permanent Undersecretary. They divided the field between them, the former recommending promotions in the diplomatic service and the latter those in the Foreign Office. The power of life and death over the careers of members of the service enjoyed by these two men naturally evoked considerable protest,⁵¹ especially from those who had not secured promotion at their hands. If a man did not receive further promotion after a number of years as Counselor he would simply throw up his hands and resign. The requirement

⁵⁰ Foreign Office List, 1923, p. 116.

⁵¹ George Young *Diplomacy Old and New*. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1921.

then in force that members of the British Service have an independent income of at least £400 a year usually enabled him to do this without personal disaster.

Despite the fact that this system seemed to work very well in practice and managed to maintain a high degree of morale in the British diplomatic service and Foreign Office staff, the growing demand for more democratic institutions finally resulted in the establishment of a Board of Promotions to make recommendations to the Secretary of State. This Board is made up of the high officials of the Foreign Office—the Permanent Undersecretary of State, the Deputy and Assistant Undersecretaries of State and the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State.⁵²

The responsibility for promotions now rests theoretically at least with the highest officers of the Service. This seems to be one way to reduce complaints from personnel to a minimum. Members of the Service expect to have to win the approval of its chiefs. Criticism of the judgment of such high officials does not set well upon any subordinate. It is only when recommendations for promotion are placed in the hands of other subordinates that criticism and complaint are inevitable and frequently justified. The difficulty of any system in which the highest officers are placed in charge of personnel is that they can seldom find time to give the matter the attention it must have to produce satisfactory results. The tendency is always to place the detailed study in the hands of subordinates who thus obtain an influence all too likely to become irritating to their colleagues. The Board of Promotions has been too recently established to offer any final

proof of its effectiveness. It served to silence the complaints against the dictatorship of the Private Secretaries but whether it will be successful in avoiding complaints on other grounds remains to be seen.

PROMOTION AND ASSIGNMENT IN THE FRENCH FOREIGN OFFICE

France has tended to maintain the system of one man control and one man responsibility. All promotions and assignments are made on the basis of recommendations by the Director of Personnel. Presumably such selections are based entirely on efficiency and never on seniority, although it is prescribed that a man shall serve a certain number of years in each grade (usually three years, but in some grades four and in some two) before he is advanced.⁵³ Sometimes a man of ability is rapidly advanced to posts where he is the subject of unfriendly comment by competitors who have more than his years both in age and in service.

The Director of Personnel is practically always either a Minister or a Consul-General. He is assigned to the *personne* post for only about three years as a rule so that one man is not permitted to secure a permanent hold on the fortunes of the members of the service.

While there are complaints and some dissatisfaction under this system, it would appear that the net result must be fairly acceptable. At least there are very few resignations from the service and its morale so far as the outside observer can judge is excellent. Nevertheless, there is evidence of a growing tendency on the part of Senators and Deputies to interfere with the purely professional handling of such

⁵² Foreign Policy Association Information Service, Vol. IV, No. 24, p. 471.

⁵³ *Journal Officiel* 28 Nov. 1920. *Decrets reglementant les positions diverses des agents des services exterieures*, p. 9.

matters, on behalf of favored officers. Such interference places a heavy burden upon the one-man system of control.

PROMOTION AND ASSIGNMENT IN THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE

Promotion in the German service is under the supervision of a board consisting of officials of the Foreign Office assigned to that duty by the Foreign Minister or Undersecretary, though the actual management is in the Chief of Personnel. The general practice follows that of the British Service; men in the lower ranks being promoted automatically or by seniority, but younger officers who display special talent may always be promoted more rapidly than their fellows. In the higher grades—those from which Ministers are appointed—individual capacity and demonstrated fitness entirely supersede seniority as the basis of promotion.

It is hardly necessary to add that such a system opens the door for political favoritism and it is well known that political factors frequently enter into questions of promotion and assignment in the German Foreign Office. This furnishes the ground for a very considerable amount of criticism of the existing system, but so far no definite steps have been taken to change it. Doubtless the effect upon the morale of the diplomatic service would be much more serious if it were not that this service is considered one of the most desirable under the Republic. Now that the army and navy have been reduced to comparatively small numbers, the diplomatic service offers a career which carries perhaps the most dignity and prestige. Its members are therefore inclined to make the best of things and not to invite trouble by too much criticism.

One means of allaying complaint is

to give a man promotion in rank, but not in salary. A man will be moved up a grade so far as his title and position are concerned but his salary and duties remain as before until a vacancy occurs which enables the authorities to convert his nominal promotion into actual promotion.

PROMOTION AND ASSIGNMENT IN THE ITALIAN FOREIGN OFFICE

In the Italian Foreign Office all promotions are made strictly on merit, even the position of seniority in the various grades not being considered.

The matter of promotion and assignments is in the hands of a Personnel Board which consists of the Directors General of the Foreign Office and is presided over by the Minister himself or the Undersecretary. This board passes on all promotions and their decision is final.

It is probably to be expected that a board made up in this way and on which sit the highest officers of the organization would handle the matter of promotions and assignments so as to give as little ground for complaint as possible. Subordinate officers expect to have to make good with the superior officers of their organization and the tendency is to accept their decision as to relative merit with no more than the human minimum of criticism. This appears to be confirmed by the reports of the high morale and general lack of complaint in the Italian service, though doubtless, this is reinforced by the spirit of self-abnegation on behalf of the nation which is encouraged by the Fascist doctrine.

The difficulty in applying such a system generally, as noted in the case of England, is that it requires either a great deal of the time and attention of the higher officers to examine and compare efficiency reports or the relegation of such examination to subordi-

nates. High officials of a government department can seldom be counted upon to assume the irksome task of examining efficiency reports of men they never saw and whose names they have never heard. Officially or unofficially, the work is almost always relegated to secretaries or other subordinates. When that occurs, there follows almost inevitably a succession of abuses which leads direct to criticism, complaint, loss of morale and numerous resignations.

PROMOTION AND ASSIGNMENT IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The system of handling promotions and assignments in force in the State Department illustrates very well the difficulties along the lines mentioned in the last paragraph. Promotions and assignments were until recently recommended by the Foreign Service Personnel Board. This Board consisted of the Undersecretary, acting as Chairman, two Assistant Secretaries, one consular officer from Class I of the Foreign Service, one consular officer from Class II and one diplomatic officer from Class II.⁵⁴ At the time of the executive officers serving on this Board was well occupied with matters of policy, the three junior officials were constituted an Executive Committee and this Executive Committee was charged with the preparation and custody of efficiency records of the Foreign Service, the recommendation of candidates for promotion, recommendations concerning assignment to posts, and recommendations regarding separations from the Service. Under a Departmental Order of June 9, 1924 all personnel records are confidential and cannot be seen by individual members of the Foreign Service.⁵⁵

Here was a machinery admirably

adapted to make trouble. The initiative in making recommendations for promotion was placed in the hands of three men, who were themselves competitors for promotion. The fact that three higher officials of the State Department were members of the Board, while it offered some check to undue favoritism, at the same time scattered responsibility so that it came home to no one high official. It was not necessary under these circumstances that there should have been actual abuse of the powers of the Executive Committee of the Personnel Board. It was practically inevitable that members of the Foreign Service should have felt that such abuse existed. The Secretary of State would naturally select the members of this Executive Committee from among the ablest Foreign Service officers. He would as naturally recommend them for promotions in due course and this might be entirely on his own initiative and not on theirs. But the men in the field who saw these members of the Foreign Service assigned to Washington advancing in rank while they themselves remained stationary could hardly be expected to exorcise the demon of jealousy and hold their minds free from the suspicion that the men on the Executive Committee were using their opportunities for their own ends.

In May of 1927 two members of the Personnel Board, one an Assistant Secretary of State and the other the Chairman of the Executive Committee, and a former Foreign Service officer then also serving as Assistant Secretary of State, were appointed on the same day to be Ministers at three important legations in Europe. There was nothing to indicate that these men had recommended their own promotions; few have ever raised any question as to their qualifications for the posts to which they were appointed; but the

⁵⁴ Register of the State Department, 1928, p. 26.

⁵⁵ American Foreign Service, 1927, p. 25.

incident appeared to many already discouraged members of the Foreign Service to be the final *reductio ad absurdum* of the Department's promotion system.

This triple appointment, despite the fact that it was a recognition by the Administration of the desirability of promoting career officers of the Foreign Service to be chiefs of mission, let loose a flood of criticism and charges of favoritism. It was claimed that there was a clique in the Foreign Service which had worked its way into the Personnel Board and there taken advantage of the opportunity to place its friends in the most desirable posts and send others to undesirable ones, and, what was worse, to distribute promotions liberally among its own members and their following. There ensued an investigation by a Senate Committee at which it was brought out that every member of the Foreign Service or the Department's staff—with one exception—who served upon the Personnel Board between July 1, 1924, and May of 1928 received at least one promotion and some of them two. Further it was found that in all promotions since July 1, 1924, there appeared preëminently the names of officers who had served upon, or with or under the members of the Personnel Board.

No small proportion of the complaints which arise in our Foreign Service are due to the lack of sympathy between the diplomatic and consular officers. As has already been stated, the Rogers Act of 1924 united these two services into one Foreign Service. Consular salaries were raised slightly except in the highest ranks, where they were reduced. The salaries of diplomatic secretaries, which had been far below those of consular officers, were raised to the same scale. Thus a diplomatic secretary of the first class who had been receiving \$4000 a year

was suddenly raised to \$9000, the salary enjoyed by a Consul-General of the first class. Equal rank followed equal pay. This sudden change of status happened to be coincident with the demand for qualified political officers in the Department of State which, with the salaries available to the Secretary, he found difficult or impossible to fill from outside. Foreign Service officers were therefore called into the Department, not to serve under experienced executives as had been contemplated by the framers of the Rogers Act, but themselves to assume high executive office. As the diplomatic secretaries had had much more experience in matters of international policy than had the consular officers, the majority of men called to these posts of high responsibility were diplomatic secretaries. The Department itself having recognized their ability and shown its need for their services, it was probably natural that their own qualities should receive an enhanced value in their own eyes and that they should feel it quite appropriate that a generous share of the rewards of the Service should come their way. By the time the Senatorial investigation occurred in 1928, 63 per cent of all the former diplomatic officers in the united service had received promotion while less than 40 per cent of the consular officers had been so favored.

Under these circumstances it is pertinent to quote one of the conclusions of the Senate Committee. The Committee says:

We believe that that the handling of the Foreign Service personnel should be divorced from the personnel itself. We believe it to be bad practice for Foreign Service officers to be passing upon the qualifications of their colleagues.

Some time after this report was filed and following the resignation of Undersecretary Olds, the Personnel Board was reorganized with three Assistant

Secretaries, Mr. Carr, Mr. Castle and Mr. Johnson as members. By this new arrangement it is hoped to eliminate the unpopular influence of an executive committee made up of officers of the Foreign Service itself. As has been pointed out in connection with some of the European foreign offices, the handling of personnel problems by higher executive officials should reduce the complaints of the members of the service to a minimum. The question as to whether these officials can assume real and effective control remains open. Two of them have supervision over political questions, one for Europe and one for Asia. The third is responsible for the budget and much of the administration of the Department. They are faced with the same problem which must face any Personnel Board made up of officers whose chief work lies in other fields. It is highly doubtful whether they can devote to questions of personnel administration, the time and attention necessary to secure satisfactory results, without neglecting other and equally important work elsewhere. They will in any case find no easy solution of the problem of reconciling the rival claims to promotion of the diplomatic and consular branches of the service.

While the merit of uniting the diplomatic and consular services is not to be judged solely on the basis of its effect upon promotions, at least one aspect of this question is pertinent in the present connection. If it is thought desirable to continue the united Foreign Service it might be well to consider whether in each of its upper grades there should not be established a definite ratio of consular and diplomatic officers and whether promotions should not be required to be made in such a manner as to preserve the ratio. Whoever recommended the promotions under such circumstances,

the competition between diplomatic and consular officers would be eliminated and members of each branch of the Service would be competing only with officers doing similar work.⁵⁶

In view of the large number of Foreign Service officers in the State Department the question of the handling of Foreign Service personnel has a dual interest for the Department,—the primary one of administration of the Foreign Service and the secondary one of providing officers for its own staff.

Even if the Foreign Service Personnel Board succeeds in solving these questions satisfactorily, there remains an equally serious problem in connection with the officers of the Department who are not members of the Foreign Service—in general, those known as “drafting officers.”⁵⁷ These men under the existing system are appointed without examination. The positions to which they are appointed, however, are classified and the salary range fixed by the Personnel Classification Board. This Board is nominally made up of the Director of the Budget, a member of the Civil Service Commission and the chief of the Bureau of Efficiency. Serious question has been raised as to the qualifications of these officials adequately to estimate the responsibilities of various posts in the State Department. The law, however, provides that each of these may appoint a subordinate to serve in his place. In practice the Board has always consisted of subordinates. The resulting experience has been most unfortunate. It is difficult for men in minor positions to achieve an attitude of mind which readily admits that any other office carries greater responsibilities, demands

⁵⁶ For further discussion of this matter see p. 50.

⁵⁷ For a consideration of this whole problem in detail reference is made to Mr. Stone's study in *F P A. Information Service*, Vol. IV. Special Supplement 3.

higher qualifications and is entitled to larger compensation, than their own. When the natural psychology of the situation is reinforced by a recurrent demand for economy, the result is almost inevitably to fix salaries at a point so low that it is impossible to secure properly qualified men to fill the positions. At this point, however, the State Department problem impinges upon the whole matter of compensation for government officials, a matter which is beyond the scope of this

survey. Suffice it to say here that the present arrangement militates strongly against securing adequately equipped officers for responsible positions in the State Department, and practically excludes the possibility of organizing a Department staff which is capable of furnishing higher executives, as occasion demands. We have already seen that the practice of importing Foreign Service officers into the Department, on this account, has given anything but satisfactory results.

CHAPTER V

RELATION BETWEEN DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR SERVICE

THAT the problem of the relation between the diplomatic and consular officers has presented difficulties on the other side of the water is apparent from the varying methods of handling it. These methods may be outlined here for the bearing which they may have on the general question of administration in our own service.

THE BRITISH CONSULAR SERVICE

The British Consular Service is quite separate from the service which furnishes the diplomatic officers and staffs the Foreign Office. Candidates are admitted to the Consular Service under the usual civil service examination by passing an additional examination in general economics. The requirements are sufficiently high so that the majority of successful candidates are university graduates, although the personal and intellectual requirements are not as exacting as those associated with the diplomatic service.

The Consular Service consists of three branches, known as the General Service, the Far Eastern Service and the Levant Service. Successful candidates may choose which branch they

prefer to enter and if their choice falls in the Levant or Far Eastern Service they are assigned permanently to those sections of the world. These men are given special training at government expense in the languages of the countries served by their branches. An effort is made after the period of preliminary training and the assignment of a man to a particular post, to keep him there as long as the exigencies of the service allow, in order that he may secure the widest possible acquaintance with local conditions and personalities.

The administration of the Consular Service is in a Department presided over by a Counselor of the Foreign Office, but which is responsible to the Department of Overseas Trade, a joint Department under the Foreign Office and the Board of Trade.⁵⁸ It would seem that a system which placed the consuls under an administration in which no member of the Consular Service had any effective part would be likely to breed considerable discontent. The fact that it does not, and that the morale of the British Consular Service is very good, may find its explanation in the entire elimination of any direct

⁵⁸ See p. 29.

competition between members of the Consular Service and the Diplomatic Service. The diplomatic officer in charge receives his own credit by giving the Consular Service itself as good an administration as he possibly can. The results of this system in practice have been highly commendable.

THE FRENCH CONSULAR SERVICE

In France the diplomatic and consular services run parallel until the higher offices are reached, when they are merged in one. For example, a man assigned to the diplomatic branch goes through the following grades:

Embassy attaché
Secretary, third class
Secretary, second class
Secretary, first class
Counselor

In the Consular Service he goes through the following grades:

Chancery attaché
Vice Consul
Chancellor
Consul, third class
Consul, second class
Consul, first class
Consul General

Diplomatic Service

Secretary of legation
Counselor of legation
Counselor of embassy or Minister of the 2nd class
Minister of the 1st class

Ambassador

Consular Service

Vice Consul
Consul
Consul General of the 2nd class
Consul General

Foreign Office

Secretary of legation
Counselor of legation
Ministerial supervisor

Ministerial director

Undersecretary

Transfers from one service to the other are freely made in the grades of Embassy attaché and Vice Consul. Once definitely assigned to either service a man is most likely to continue in the service to which he is assigned until he reaches the highest of the grades above listed. He may then be

called from either branch of the service to fill an executive position in the Foreign Office or, after three years of service either as Counselor of Embassy or as Consul General, he may be promoted to Minister of the second class and later to Minister of the first class. There he reaches the highest grade in the diplomatic hierarchy. The only remaining position, that of ambassador, is not a "grade" but a "dignity."⁵⁹

France thus secures specialized service and eliminates the competition between the diplomatic and consular branches until the highest offices are reached. As the man in charge of personnel for both services is sometimes a diplomatic officer and sometimes a consular officer and he has neither incentive nor opportunity to favor one branch at the expense of the other, the spirit of complaint is fairly effectively exorcised.

THE GERMAN CONSULAR SERVICE

Germany, like the United States, has, since the War, unified her diplomatic and consular services. The corresponding grades in the two services and also the grades in the Foreign Office which is staffed from them, are as follows:⁶⁰

In the opinion of the officers charged with the administration of personnel in the German Foreign Office, the unification of the services is still to be

⁵⁹ Journal officiel 28 Nov., 1920 Décrets réglementant les positions diverses des agents des services extérieurs, p 7

⁶⁰ Statement furnished by German Foreign Office

considered as in the experimental stage. Nevertheless they point out various advantages. The rising generation of officers has received a broader training than the officers of the old separate services. The interchange of officers between the two services has presented some difficulties, but on the whole has not caused a great deal of friction. The work of all agencies in foreign countries seems better coördinated under the supervision of the chief of the diplomatic mission.

It would appear, therefore, that, with considerable reservation, the present tendency is to approve the unification of the services. The supervision of matters of promotions and assignments by the high executives of the German Foreign Office has apparently eliminated any semblance of the bickering and recrimination existing between the two branches of the American service which has been all too evident since the passing of the Rogers Act.

THE ITALIAN CONSULAR SERVICE

In the Italian Foreign Service all successful candidates start as consular officers, although they may upon occasion be assigned to legations or embassies. After a "volunteer" has served his time of apprenticeship, he starts through the following grades:

Consular assistant
Vice Consul, 2nd class
Vice Consul, 1st class
Consul, 3rd class

Above this point the grades are divided into two services, as shown below.

The younger officers, as a rule,

progress fairly regularly through the four preliminary consular grades and from that into the grade of Consul of the 2nd class. After a few years in this grade they are again subjected to examination and upon passing this examination they may elect either the consular or diplomatic side for their future work. If they choose the former, they become Consuls, 1st class; that is, they are promoted one grade. If they choose the diplomatic side they become First Secretaries, 2nd class. In other words, by transferring to the diplomatic branch of the service, they sacrifice one grade in promotion. A premium is thus put upon entrance into the consular service.

A further premium on consular work is found at the top of the hierarchy. Consuls-General 1st class rank with Ministers 2nd class. In addition, there is a statutory provision which requires that ten of the allotted number of posts as Ministers 1st class shall be filled by the promotion of Consuls-General.

Here again we have the segregation of the two branches of the service so that direct competition between them for the successive steps in their advancement is practically eliminated. Promotion being in the hands of the high executive officers of the Foreign Office, the ruling influence is to secure as effective a corps of officers as possible in each branch of the service. When they come together at the top the number of promotions to the post of Minister which must be made from the consular service is fixed and no personal or political influence can be brought to bear to change the number.

Diplomatic

1st Secretary, 2nd class
1st Secretary, 1st class
Counselor of legation
Minister, 2nd class
Minister, 1st class
Ambassador

Consular

Consul, 2nd class
Consul, 1st class
Consul-General, 2nd class
Consul-General, 1st class

THE AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE⁶¹

The Act of May 24, 1924, usually referred to as the Rogers Act, divided the unified Foreign Service into nine Classes. Each of these Classes comprised certain grades of the old services and as the classifications indicate approximately the kind of work which is still expected of Foreign Service officers of the corresponding Class they are given herewith:⁶²

Foreign Service officer:

- Class 9 Consuls, classes 8 and 9
- “ 8 Secretaries, class 4
Consuls, class 7
- “ 7 Consuls, class 6
- “ 6 Secretaries, class 3
Consuls, class 5
Chinese, Japanese, Turkish assistant secretaries
- “ 5 Consuls, class 4
- “ 4 Secretaries, class 2
Consuls-General, class 5
Consuls, classes 1, 2, 3
Chinese, Japanese, Turkish secretaries
- “ 3 Secretaries, class 1 not designated as Counselors
Consuls-Generals, class 4
Consuls-Generals, at large
- “ 2 Counselors of legation
Consuls-General, class 3
- “ 1 Counselors of embassy
Consuls-General, classes 1, 2

The theory of the Rogers Act was that each class of Foreign Service officer should receive a training adequate to enable him to discharge the duties of an officer of his class, either in the consular or the diplomatic branch of the service.

⁶¹ This section should be read in connection with pp. 44, *et seq.*

⁶² Act of May 24, 1924, Sec. 7.

It was hoped in this way to assure a broader view on foreign problems and to increase the usefulness of the individual officers. Doubtless this has been realized to some extent, especially among the younger officers, who have entered the service since the Rogers Act came into operation. No doubt the desired effects will make themselves felt more strongly when these new appointees reach the higher grades of the service.

Along with such benefits as may have accrued from the operation of the Rogers Act, however, there have appeared certain unfortunate results which were not foreseen at the time the Act was passed. The lack of sympathy between the consular and diplomatic branches of the service has been, temporarily at least, increased rather than decreased. The increase of diplomatic salaries has enhanced the pressure of candidates to enter that branch of the service. The assignment of many diplomatic secretaries to high positions in Washington has intensified the feeling of the consular branch that they are not being fairly treated. The resulting discrepancy in rapidity of promotion—already discussed in the last section—has added bitterness to the antipathy between the two sides of the service.

As a consequence of these unfortunate aspects of the operation of the Rogers Act, the morale of the American Foreign Service is anything but good. During the past summer the writer discussed the situation with 19 diplomatic secretaries, 9 consuls-general and 18 consuls. With hardly a dissenting voice these men expressed dissatisfaction with their prospects in the service. While the consular officers were most vehement in their complaints, many of the diplomatic officers had severe criticisms to make of the method of handling promotions and

assignments. Thirteen chiefs of mission, with whom the writer also discussed the matter, reported dissatisfaction among their subordinates and many expressed the opinion that the administration methods must be changed. Some forty military, naval and commercial attachés were also interviewed. The contrast in the matter of morale between these groups and the consular and diplomatic groups

was marked. While it is hazardous to attempt a comparison of so intangible a matter, and especially with limited numbers, it appeared to the writer that the *esprit de corps* of the naval representatives was easily the best. Following them were the commercial attachés, then the military attachés, then the diplomatic officers, and finally, at the opposite extreme to the naval men, the consular officers.

CHAPTER VI

SALARIES AND HONORS

WHILE present conditions indicate that due weight should be given to the methods of administration of personnel, both in the Department and in the Foreign Service, it must be appreciated that the question of salaries underlies all other considerations.

It would be quite unfair to evaluate any individual, either in the State Department or the Foreign Service, according to the size of his salary. It would be unfair, to both organizations, not to call attention to the fact that the general ability and special fitness for their positions is very considerably above what would be indicated by the salaries paid. In the long run, however, the quality of men available for service in the State Department and the Foreign Service will tend to approach a level corresponding to the salary scale. The British government has recognized the necessity of adequate payment and has established rates of compensation for Foreign Office staffs very considerably higher than ours.

Comparison of salary scales between two countries with different monetary units and different standards of living is a difficult, and at best, an unsatisfactory matter. A post in Washington paying \$6,000 a year may not neces-

sarily attract a higher type of ability than one in, let us say, Tokio, at the equivalent of \$3,000 a year. The conditions in the two countries are so different that a \$3,000 salary in Japan may well appeal to an even higher level of intellectual ability in the Japanese population than that to which a \$6,000 post in Washington can appeal in this country.

Then again, the question of social prestige, quite aside from the mere amount of income, has an important bearing on the quality of the personnel obtainable. In this country a post in the State Department, with the doubtful exception of the few ranking offices, carries with it no particular social distinction. In England the case is quite different. The diplomatic service is associated with the Army, the Navy, and the Church, as a suitable calling for the sons of the aristocracy. Thus the matter of compensation receives much less emphasis. Formerly a similar condition prevailed in France. It was supposed to be the ambition of every family to have at least one member in the public service and diplomacy was the special preserve of the wealthy and titled families. There has been a distinct change in this regard in both England and France. Industry has ac-

quired a new respectability and has accordingly lessened the pressure upon the older professions. In France the failure of official salaries to keep pace with the depreciation of the franc has driven many of the class which in former days would have entered the diplomatic service to seek other fields of endeavor. In Germany the pressure toward office is almost as strong as before the War. Despite the fact that the Germans have shaken themselves free from military domination, and have considerably discounted the trappings of imperialism, nevertheless, the habit of years still asserts itself in the respect shown to an official. To be in government service carries with it satisfactions quite above and apart from the mere monetary compensation. In Italy the incursions of Fascism have tended strongly to break down the former social values. New ones are in process of formation and so far they emphasize the importance of public service, for those who are able to enter it. The matter of salary hardly enters into consideration.

There is a further factor which to some extent affects the strength of the salary appeal in different countries. That is the permanence and security of a government position. This is undoubtedly felt in all countries, the United States as well as others. There seems no room for doubt, however, that it operates much less effectively among men of ability in this country than in Europe. Economic opportunities for able men are so nearly unlimited in the United States that such a man has little need of the security afforded by a government position. The pressure toward public office on this account is much more noticeable in England and vastly stronger in both France and Germany. In Italy the peculiar conditions imposed by the Fascist régime leave little room for the play of such forces.

Allowing for these discrepancies in currency values and economic standards and for the differences in social pressure, it is interesting to compare the salaries paid in the different Foreign Offices.

BRITISH SALARY SCALE

The chief officials of the British Foreign Office receive a base salary and, in the case of the permanent officials, a cost of living bonus. The base salaries of Foreign Office officials are as follows:⁶³

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs	\$25,000
Parliamentary Undersecretary of State	7,500
Permanent Undersecretary of State	15,000
Deputy Undersecretary of State	11,000
2 Assistant Undersecretaries of State	6,000-7,500
2 Legal Advisors	6,000-7,500
15 Counselors	5,000-6,000
1 Historical Advisor	6,000
1 Head of News Department	6,000

With the exception of the first two of the above officers, all of these salaries are increased by a cost of living bonus. This bonus varies according to an index figure but in general adds about 20 per cent to the pay of the officers.

FRENCH SALARY SCALE

The French Foreign Office staff receives salaries as follows:

Secretary General	\$3,200
6 Ministers, 1st class	2,400
8 Ministers, 2nd class	1,920

The salaries given above are base salaries and in comparing them with those of other countries two items should be taken into account. They are subject to a small bonus the amount of which varies with the post, length of service, etc., of the officer concerned. In addition to this, occasional allowances are made to Foreign Office offi-

⁶³ Foreign Office List, 1928, p. 116.

cials for representation purposes. As these allowances are made from a secret fund, placed at the disposal of the Foreign Minister, a fund, which during the current year amounts to \$800,000, and as no accounting is made of this fund, it is impossible to determine just how much of it goes to Foreign Office officials in the form of allowances. It is generally conceded that the present salaries are much too low and that an assignment to a position in the Foreign Office is to be accepted as a duty rather than a pleasure. The hardship imposed by such an assignment is due primarily to the depreciation of the franc. Officers serving abroad are compensated for this depreciation, as their salaries are paid on a gold franc basis. A minister of the first class, for example, receives only \$2,400 (plus occasional allowances) in Paris but when he is sent abroad receives \$12,000. The deficiencies of such an arrangement have been recognized and legislation is at present pending in the French parliament to establish an adequate salary scale for Foreign Office officials.

GERMAN SALARY SCALE

The salaries of the principal officials of the German Foreign Office are as follows:⁶⁴

Minister of Foreign Affairs	
Undersecretary of State	6,000
10 Ministerialdirectors	4,500

The salaries given above are probably not strictly comparable with the salaries given for other countries. German government officials are entitled to draw pensions, fixed at a percentage of their salary, at the time of retirement. Salaries per se are therefore kept at as low a figure as possible. Nevertheless, it is admitted that such salaries as those above listed, would not enable the

officers concerned to live in Berlin on a scale commensurate with their position and responsibilities. Some, of course, have private incomes. But it is also practically certain that the officials of the Foreign Office receive, in one way or another, a considerably larger compensation than that indicated above. In this connection it may be mentioned that the Foreign Minister has a fund amounting to \$1,500,000 for the expenditure of which he is not required to account. This fund may be used in such manner as the Foreign Minister thinks best. A share of it is known to go to diplomatic officers abroad in the form of representation allowances. The German Ambassador in Washington, for example, in addition to his basic salary, of less than \$4,750, receives a representation allowance of \$35,000. Even this may be increased if occasion demands. Foreign Office officials also receive occasional allowances from this fund, but how much cannot be ascertained. As in France, the low salaries are partly due to currency depreciation. The Reichstag is now considering this problem and a new and more adequate salary scale is expected in the near future.

ITALIAN SALARY SCALE

As already indicated, salaries under the Fascist régime are exceedingly low. There is some attempt to add necessary funds through various allowances but

	Salary	Allow- ance	Total
Minister of Foreign Affairs	\$1,250	\$1,140	\$2,390
Undersecretary of State	685	507	1,192
6 Ministers, 1st class	1,600	525	2,125
5 Ministers, 2nd class	1,350	475	1,825
2 Consuls General	1,350	475	1,825

⁶⁴ Reichsbesoldungsgesetz vom 16 Dezember, 1927, pp. 64, 65.

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salary and allowances together do not run to excessive figures. The salaries and allowances of the higher officials of the Foreign Office are stated on preceding page.

UNITED STATES SALARY SCALE

Under the terms of the Welch Bill, which was passed in May, 1928, the salaries of the higher officials of the State Department have been somewhat increased. This increase in salary has been accompanied by a change in the personnel in only one case, that of the Undersecretary. The reallocation of salaries was made as of July 1st last, and the salaries of the higher officials of the Department are given below as they were before this reallocation and as they are now:

	Before July 1, 1928	After July 1, 1928
Secretary of State	\$15,000	\$15,000
Undersecretary of State	7,500	8,000
4 Assistant Secretaries of State	7,500	9,000
Legal Advisor	7,000	8,000
Economic Advisor	6,000	8,000
1 Division Chief	6,000	8,000
2 Division Chiefs	8,000	8,000
2 Division Chiefs	7,000	7,000

This salary scale presents a curious anomaly in that the Undersecretary of State, the ranking officer of the Department after the Secretary himself, receives a smaller salary than the four Assistant Secretaries who are subordinate to him in rank. The explanation of this is to be found in the fact that, under the Welch Act and the resulting reclassification of July 1, 1928, the four Assistant Secretaries and the then Undersecretary were held by the Comptroller General to be entitled to the highest salary in their grade, \$9,000 a year. The Undersecretary resigned as

of July 1, 1928, and his successor, taking office after that date, was held to be entitled, under the provisions of the classification act, only to the lowest salary in the grade, \$8,000 a year. His salary can be raised to \$9,000, under present legislation, only when at least three of the Assistant Secretaries have given place to new men, who will come in at the lower salary and thus permit the Undersecretary to receive the higher salary, without raising the average of the five salaries above the average for the grade. Thus, while politically and administratively the Undersecretary is considered to be the superior officer of the Assistant Secretaries, so far as compensation is concerned, the five officers are classed together, with the resulting anomaly.

Another point in connection with State Department salaries should be mentioned. Attention has already been called to the fact that fifty or more Foreign Service officers have been called to the Department to perform services for which the Department staff is inadequate. Foreign Service officers thus assigned to the Department continue to draw their Foreign Service salaries. These are on a much higher level than the salaries of the staff officers of the Department. The result is that in numerous cases two men, one a Foreign Service officer and one a staff officer, are working side by side at the same work and the former receives a salary much higher, and sometimes twice as great, as the latter. There are also many cases where Foreign Service officers, assigned to the Department, are receiving salaries considerably in excess of those of their superior officers. The dissatisfaction caused by these inequalities of pay is a source of constant irritation and places serious difficulties in the way of securing a smoothly working administrative organization.

FOREIGN OFFICE ORGANIZATION

COMPARISON OF SALARY SCALES

From the available information as to the compensation of Foreign Office officials in the several countries covered by this survey, it appears that their respective Foreign Ministers and the Secretary of State have as their chief assistants and advisers the following:

The British Foreign Minister has 19 officials at an average salary of \$8,300 (7 of these receive an average salary of \$10,200).

The French Foreign Minister has 15 officials at an average salary of \$2,200 (plus undetermined allowances).

The German Foreign Minister has 11 officials at an average salary of \$4,635 (plus occasional allowances).

The Italian Foreign Minister has 14 officials at an average salary of \$1,980.

The American Secretary of State has 12 officials at an average salary of \$8,200 (until July 1, 1928, \$7,200).


These figures thus compared make no allowance for the difference in the cost of living between Washington and the foreign capitals. It is estimated that in the case of London this must be between 15 per cent and 20 per cent. In the case of Paris and Berlin it would be considerably more and there would be a still higher differential in the case of Rome. Figures on the comparative cost of living, however, are so unsatisfactory that it seems hardly desirable to attempt to compare salaries on that basis. Such a comparison would simply bring into bolder relief the obvious fact that Great Britain, at least, finds it to its advantage to pay the executive staff of its Foreign Office considerably more than the United States pays its State Department staff.

Such a comparison would not bring out the full significance of the difference. What really matters is the stratum of its intellectual ability from which each country is staffing its For-

eign Office; from what level of its brain power it is drawing the men who shape its foreign policy. It must be repeated that the salary is not the only factor involved in such a comparison. Men with individual fortunes may go into the Foreign Office without regard to the salary they are to receive, others, not so happily provided, may make large sacrifices because of their interest in this particular kind of public service. These non-financial factors are operative in this country, but it is certain that they have nothing like as large an influence with us as they have in the European countries. In general, these factors operate very slightly to compensate for the lower salaries paid in the State Department. In Europe they operate almost wholly to reinforce the appeal of the salaries paid by the great Foreign Offices.

The whole matter may be summed up in the statement that in the European countries work in the Foreign Office is looked upon as a career, while here it is all too often merely a steppingstone to diplomatic advancement, or to a prominent position in law, journalism, or the banking world. The compensation offered for the higher Foreign Office posts in the European countries, small as it sometimes seems, is sufficient to hold many in the service throughout their working lives. Obviously the prospects of a final salary of \$9,000 will very seldom offer sufficient incentive to hold a high grade man in the State Department throughout his working life. In practice the Department must choose between men of long service but no great initiative who are content to remain at the low salaries provided, and young men of ability who bring to their tasks initiative and enthusiasm but who, after a few years, receive offers from the business or professional world, which few of them resist. As a result, the higher staff of the State Depart-

Comparison of Salaries of Higher Officials in Foreign Offices and Department of State



ment, instead of being a group of mature men of long training and experience who are capable of giving substance and continuity to the foreign policy of the United States, becomes a sort of school for promising young men, giving a training which is invaluable to them in their later careers but the advantage of which is all too soon lost to the government. "John Jones, Assistant Secretary of State" is nowhere near as important a figure as, and can command nowhere near the income of "John Jones, Counselor at Law, formerly Assistant Secretary of State."

To return to the financial factor, it would be valuable to know at just what point in the scale of earned incomes in each country these salaries fall. Unfortunately statistics sufficiently detailed to enable us to make such a comparison do not exist. We can, however, get some light from a comparison of the salaries paid in the different countries with the per capita income of those countries. Estimates of the per capita income do not always agree. The following will be used here and corrections may be made to suit the reader's taste by substituting other figures.

PER CAPITA INCOME

Great Britain	\$451
France .	175
Germany .	210
Italy	123
United States .	775

The financial attraction of the Foreign Office salaries in the five countries covered by this survey may be estimated from the following comparison of the average salaries paid higher Foreign Office officials, with the per capita income of that country:

Great Britain averages 18.4 times the per capita income.

France averages 12.6 times the per capita income.

Germany averages 22 times the per capita income.

Italy averages 15.4 times the per capita income.

United States averages 10.5 times the per capita income.

(No account is taken herein of the undetermined allowances to French and German officials.)

It is apparent from these calculations that each of the foreign countries mentioned pays its Foreign Office officials much more generously in proportion to its general level of incomes than does the United States. Thus, on a financial basis alone, the Foreign Office in each of these countries can draw its personnel from a higher stratum of ability and experience than can the State Department. To the financial factor must, of course, be added the factors of economic and social pressure already mentioned. There is still another factor to be considered, that of rank, honors and titles.

RANK, HONORS AND TITLES

Whatever scorn philosophers may heap upon worldly honors there is abundant evidence that they play a very real part in shaping the course of human actions. No one who has had any experience with ranks and titles in army, navy, ecclesiastical, collegiate, or even business circles, can entertain any doubt as to the importance attached to such matters.

Foreign governments have, throughout history, played upon this trait of human nature by the distribution of honors and titles. They have found it valuable not only in the army and navy but in the diplomatic service. All of His Majesty's ambassadors and about one-third of his ministers plenipotentiary are either knights or members of the nobility. Likewise about a third of the higher officials of the Foreign Office enjoy a title of knighthood.

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Members of the French diplomatic and consular corps become members of the Legion of Honor practically automatically upon the completion of twenty years' service. In Germany the republican régime has swept away the old titles but the respect formerly accorded them seems to have been transferred almost bodily to the new titles of office. A "Staatssekretär" or a "Ministerialdirector" stands quite as high in the public regard as a "Fürst" or "Graf" of the Imperial régime. Italy

has her orders of knighthood and higher titles which are judiciously distributed in return for distinguished service in the Foreign Office and the diplomatic and consular services.


There is little in the United States that is strictly comparable to this practice. The titles of "Secretary," "Ambassador" and "Minister" sometimes cling to men who have served in such capacities and have no larger claim to fame. A Secretary of State can usually count upon collecting a

Comparative Rank of Higher Foreign Office Personnel

Relative
Diplomatic


Great Britain

Foreign Minister





France

Foreign Minister



Germany


Foreign Minister



Italy

Foreign Minister


Ambassador
Minister
Counselor



America

Secretary of State

Ambassador
Minister
Counselor



varied assortment of "LL.D.'s" from the universities of the country during his incumbency. Similar honors are occasionally accorded lesser officials. But these, after all, are given by private institutions and have not the prestige of a government accolade. As suggested above, a man who has occupied high office in the State Department does enjoy a certain amount of prestige in his later career from occasional reference to this fact. There is, however, nothing in our system which plays the same rôle as the award of honors and titles in the European systems.

It is not suggested that it would be in the least desirable to institute such a system of honors and titles. Attention is called to its absence merely to point out that the salary appeal in foreign countries is reinforced by the very human desire to win an obvious mark of distinction. It would be impossible to measure the strength of this desire by any exact sum of money but it is quite conceivable that \$10,000 a year and a knighthood in England would be considered the equivalent of \$12,000 a year in this country, (putting aside for the moment all considerations of rates of exchange and comparative costs of living).

While any system of titles of nobility or government honors is out of the question for this country, it is still possible to accord to the higher officials of the State Department a rank corresponding to the dignity and responsibility of their posts. At present, with the exception of the Secretary of State himself, no officer of the State Depart-

ment has any rank in Washington other than that of a government employe of a specified class. In the case of the Undersecretary and the Assistant Secretaries this class includes all officers of a similar grade in all the other government departments. The Undersecretary of State is officially a person of no more distinction than the junior Assistant Secretary in the least important of the government departments. This may be justified as an application of democratic theory, but in practice it simply does not work. The qualifications desirable in an Undersecretary of State are such as very few men in the country possess. These men, by the time they have acquired the years of experience which an Undersecretary of State should have, will have risen, even in the government service, to a position where the acceptance of the Undersecretaryship is a distinct step down—a demotion. There is no more reason in democratic theory for keeping this office on a level with an Assistant Secretaryship, in the Department of Agriculture, or the Interior, or in the Post Office, than there is for keeping cabinet officers on a level with clerks. If we are to make our democracy a practicable thing, we must devote our attention to equality of opportunity, and not to limitation of achievement. According a suitable rank to the Undersecretary and Assistant Secretaries of State would make it much easier for the President and the Secretary of State to secure properly qualified men to fill these positions.

CHAPTER VII

FOREIGN OFFICE BUDGETS

FOREIGN OFFICE BUDGETS

FIGURES in regard to the total expenditures of the Foreign Offices in the five countries covered by this survey

throw additional light on the problem we are discussing. Here we have the published reports of the budgets for the various countries and we can calculate with some degree of accuracy the

relative importance which they give to their respective Foreign Offices.

BRITISH BUDGET

In Great Britain the budget for the Foreign Office is prepared by its own finance officer. He then goes over it in informal conference with an official in the Treasury who makes recommendations from the point of view of the funds which are to be available. In the case of a serious difference of opinion between these two officers they may refer it to their respective Ministers. If these cannot agree the Cabinet itself may be called upon to decide between them, but this rarely occurs. Despite the pressure toward rigid economy which has been felt in England since the War, the Treasury has never accepted the puerile proposal to cut the expense in all departments by a fixed percentage. The funds needed for the efficient functioning of each department are first determined and then the money is found.

FRENCH BUDGET

France follows a budgetary system very similar to that of England. The budget for the Foreign Office is made up in the office of the Director of Personnel and Accounting and receives the approval of the Secretary General. It then goes to the Ministry of Finance where an effort is made to cut it to the minimum amount which will still enable the Foreign Office to function efficiently. Any difference between the two offices is usually reconciled by the Ministers concerned. If they cannot agree a Cabinet crisis follows. When they have agreed, Parliament rarely makes any substantial changes in the estimates.

GERMAN BUDGET

The system of appropriations in Germany does not differ materially from

that of England or France. The Finance Ministry sets forth general regulations for the preparation of department budgets and the Foreign Office makes up its budget under these regulations. When this budget receives the approval of the Finance Minister he submits it to the Reichstag as a part of the general national budget.

ITALIAN BUDGET

In Italy an unusual system is in force. There the Foreign Office has nothing to do with making up its budget. The budget of each department is made up in the Finance Ministry and when it is approved, the departments, the Foreign Office among them, are notified as to the amount they will have available for the ensuing year.

UNITED STATES BUDGET

Our national budget system is a matter of quite recent development. The present practice is for the various departments, the State Department included, to make their own budget estimates and submit them to the Director of the Budget, an official of the Treasury Department. The function of this officer, in pursuit of a general policy of economy, has been to cut all appropriations to the lowest possible figure. In this process there seems to have been some attempt to arrive at the same percentage of reductions in all departments. Under these circumstances the Department of State has been able to make little progress in securing proper provision for its greatly increased post-war needs. For example, the Department asked for \$17,360,247.45 to meet all of its requirements, including international obligations, in 1929. The Director of the Budget, in spite of the need for a larger staff with better pay in the Department itself and the need of at least 122 additional Foreign Service officers to enable the Department

properly to staff the foreign missions, cut the Department's estimate to \$14,744,831.43, a "slash" of \$2,615,416.02. About a million dollars of this cut was in salaries for the personnel.⁶⁵

Only \$45,680 of the reduction was made under the heading of international obligations. The Department's estimate of its own needs, as distinguished from those of the Foreign Service, was cut \$1,765,878.89.

The rapidly increasing demands upon the Department and the Foreign Service are now a matter of common knowledge. Yet the appropriations for the running expenses of the whole foreign establishment are less than 10% larger for 1929 than they were for 1919. The 1929 appropriations are actually smaller than the 1920 appropriations. During the intervening years they have

cost of the entire foreign establishment to the country in the year of its highest post-war appropriation (save 1920) will be \$2,243,565. This great Department, with its enormous responsibilities, is almost self-supporting. The burden upon the taxpayer is infinitesimal and could be very readily enlarged to cover all of the requirements necessary to give it a proper establishment and still remain infinitesimal.

A comparison of the State Department budget with those of the Foreign Offices abroad may be helpful. The actual appropriation for the Foreign Office, the Foreign Service and all expenditures for representation abroad of the five countries covered by this survey, together with total receipts and net costs, are shown in the following table:

COMPARISON OF BUDGETS

	Total Appropriations	Receipts from Fees	Net Cost
Great Britain ^a .	\$10,607,730	\$3,536,070	\$7,071,660
France ^b	9,335,190	5,756,196	3,578,995
Germany ^c	16,126,975	936,925	15,190,050
Italy ^d	6,879,605	3,200,000	3,679,605
United States ^e	11,002,048	8,758,483	2,243,565

^a Civil Estimates 1929

^b Rapport du Budget, 1928, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères

^c German Budget 1928-9

^d Stato di Previsione della Spesa del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 1928-9, p 9

^e Hearings, House Subcommittee on Appropriations for State Department, 1928, pp 2, 13, 14

varied from \$9,400,000 to \$10,200,000 and for the current year the total is only a shade over \$11,000,000.

The refusal to make proper provision for the State Department is the more astonishing when the actual receipts of that Department in the shape of passport, consular and other fees are taken into account. This item is estimated for next year at \$8,758,483. The net

These figures are of additional significance when they are related to the total national budget and other financial items of the respective countries. In this way we are enabled to get some measure of the relative importance which these countries attach to their Foreign Offices. The total appropriations for the foreign establishment in some of these percentages are shown on the following page.

The net costs of the various foreign

⁶⁵ Hearings, House Sub-Committee on Appropriations, 1928, pp. 13 and 14.

THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY

	Great Britain	France	Germany	Italy	United States
Total appropriation in percentage of national budget	25	60	70	.68	.26
Total appropriation in percentage of budget for army and navy	1 90	2 80	9 00	2 90	1 37
Total appropriation in percentage of total foreign trade	10	25	26	40	12

offices in similar percentages are shown below.

These figures and percentages are of interest only as they afford an opportunity for a comparison of the value placed upon the work of the Foreign Office by the different countries. It will hardly be contended that the foreign affairs of the United States, no matter what the criterion used, are less

conflicts, a larger percentage of its appropriations for military and naval purposes than does the United States. In terms of these percentages Great Britain devotes to its Foreign Office 1.4 times the amount the United States devotes to the State Department; France spends 2 times, Germany 6 times and Italy 2.1 times the American percentage.

	Great Britain	France	Germany	Italy	United States
Net cost in percentage of national budget	20	23	59	36	056
Net cost in percentage of budget for army and navy	1 50	1 10	8 50	1 70	32
Net cost in percentage of foreign trade	07	09	.25	20	027

important than those of any other country in the world. Yet in percentages of the total budget of the governments, while Great Britain spends for its Foreign Office and Foreign Service practically the same amount expended by this country for similar purposes, France spends 2.3 times, Germany 2.7 times and Italy 2.6 times the American amount.

We are prone to emphasize the pacific frame of mind of the people of this country, and to accept rather readily comments on the "militarism" of Europe. Yet every one of the European Powers covered by this survey spends in support of its Foreign Office, its governmental department devoted to the peaceful solution of international

Foreign trade is one of the most usable measures of the international interests of any country. It is one of the functions of the State Department, entirely aside from the work of commercial attachés and trade commissioners, to protect the foreign trade of the country. In terms of percentages of foreign trade, the Foreign Office appropriation of Great Britain is not quite as large as that of the United States as the British trade figures exceed ours; but the French Foreign Office receives 2.1 times, the German Foreign Office 2.2 times and the Italian Foreign Office 3.3 times the support given the State Department.

The comparison of net costs produces still more striking results. In terms of

FOREIGN OFFICE ORGANIZATION


percentages of the total budget, the net cost of the British Foreign Office is 3.6 times that of the State Department; the net cost of the French Foreign Office 4.1 times, of the German Foreign Office 10 times and of the Italian Foreign Office 6.5 times that of the State Department.

In percentages of foreign trade, the net cost of the British Foreign Office is 2.5 times, of the French Foreign Office 3.3 times, of the German Foreign Office 9.2 times and of the Italian Foreign Office 7.4 times that of the United States.


The item of net cost in proportion to the total national budget is perhaps

COMPARISON OF NET COST OF FOREIGN OFFICES


In percentages of National Budget



In percentages of Expenditure for National Defense



In percentages of Total Foreign Trade



In percentages of the defense appropriations, the net cost of the British Foreign Office is 4.6 times that of the United States; of the French Foreign Office 3.3 times, of the German Foreign Office 27 times and of the Italian Foreign Office 5 times that of the United States.

the most significant one. In proportion to the total expenses of the government in these countries, their Foreign Offices are very much more generously treated than is ours. By this measure of the actual support given to the Foreign Offices, the State Department is left sadly behind.

If we consider diplomacy as a contest between the diplomatic forces of the various countries for the protection and advancement of the national interests, this country is subject to a material handicap because of its failure to provide a service which will attract and hold men of larger abilities. If we consider diplomacy as the medium by which the various states of the

world are striving to work out a peaceful and mutually beneficial solution of the problems which face civilization, then the United States, through what appears to be inexcusable parsimony in its support of its foreign establishment, is not making anywhere near its proportionate contribution to the solution of these problems.

CHAPTER VIII

PUBLICITY

HERE is one further item which impresses itself upon the student of Foreign Office organization. While it does not constitute a cog in the actual grinding out of decisions in matters of foreign policy, nevertheless it is a most important adjunct to the work of the foreign offices. I refer to the press department. In practically every country of Europe the press division of the Foreign Office, established in most cases during or since the War, is considered one of the most important departments. Frequently it is in charge of a man with the rank and experience of a minister and always it is in charge of a highly qualified official who enjoys the full confidence of the executives of the foreign office concerned.

Quite naturally the press division does not play the same rôle in each country. In the more highly organized and democratically inclined countries of Western Europe the press division is looked upon as a means of liaison between the Foreign Office and the public. It furnishes information to the press in regard to the progress of international events and negotiations. In these countries the officers in charge of the press division, as well as their superiors, would scorn to resort to propaganda in the sense of misleading the people of their own or other countries.

It would do them little good if they were so inclined, for the press of these countries is represented by men who are themselves thoroughly familiar with the problems of international relations and whom it would be practically impossible to deceive and very difficult to mislead. On the other hand, as one gets over into Eastern Europe, and particularly towards the Balkans, one finds even more importance given to the press division of the Foreign Office, but far less restraint placed upon its official exuberance. One chief of a press division (in a country not included in this survey) explained with considerable pride that it was not possible to state the amount of the budget appropriation for his office as he had access to unlimited secret funds and nobody but himself and the Prime Minister knew how much was expended. He went on to outline in the most refreshing manner the way in which he carried on propaganda both at home and abroad. In this exposition the idea of making known to his own people the truth about international affairs did not appear.

These are the two extremes. Doubtless the press divisions of the various Foreign Offices could furnish examples of all the stages in between. But the fact remains that in almost every

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country the press division plays an important part in the work of the Foreign Office.

THE BRITISH PRESS DIVISION

The press division of the British Foreign Office is known as the News Department. It is in charge of a man who had attained high standing as a journalist before his acceptance of the Foreign Office post with the rank of Counselor. He is one of the few men in the British Foreign Office who is not a professional diplomat. His training, however, has given him an intimate acquaintance with the whole field of international politics and, what is more important, he enjoys the complete confidence of the ranking officials of the Foreign Office and is in constant touch with them as to developments.

The News Department has two functions. The first of these is to distribute news to the press. Before the War there was no such organ in the British Foreign Office and journalists got such news as they could from friends on the inside. This, of course, was the source of many abuses, not the least of which was that a correspondent who obtained news in such a way was expected to support the Government's policies. Now the News Department distributes news freely and impartially to all comers.

However, it holds no press conferences. Very rarely does any official of the British Foreign Office meet the representatives of the press in a body. Nor does the News Department distribute press releases. It is simply there and ready to give information at any time to any journalist who seeks it. If it has not the answer to a question immediately available it communicates with the department concerned and obtains it. If it is not of a confidential nature the information is freely given to the inquiring correspondent.

It is sometimes possible to obtain in this way information which could not be elicited in reply to a formal question in Parliament. The reason for this is that information obtained from the News Department of the Foreign Office is not published as official news, but is given out on the authority of the journal itself.

The second function of the News Department is to prepare news for the daily wireless service. This service is designed primarily to furnish news to British ships at sea. It is broadcast three times a day and thus requires the constant attention of those in charge of it.

The News Department does not under the British scheme of organization pay any attention to the press of foreign countries. This is left to the various embassies and legations abroad, the more important of which have press attachés for this purpose. The chief of the News Department has a staff of eight men to assist him in the work of the department.

THE FRENCH PRESS SERVICE

The press division of the French Foreign Office is known as the Service of Information of the Press. It is under the immediate supervision of the Secretary General himself and is in charge of a Minister of the Second Class. Its work is considerably more extended than that of the British News Department. It is divided into three sections.

The first of these is the Section of Information, whose function is to reply at any moment to requests for information on the latest developments in foreign affairs. The chief of the Service being a diplomatic officer of high rank and carefully selected for his post, is in constant touch with the Minister, the Secretary-General and the other higher officials of the Foreign

Office. In addition to this he sees all dispatches which come to the *Quai d'Orsay* and all the replies sent out by its officials. He then communicates such matters as are not confidential to the four or five men who constitute the Information Section. These men discuss questions with representatives of the press either by telephone or in their offices at any time they are called upon to do so. The chief of the Service himself holds daily press conferences as follows:

For French agencies and journalists at 12 and 7.

For English and American agencies and journalists at 12.30.

For German agencies and journalists at 4.30.

Considerable emphasis is given to the fact that these press conferences make no attempt to influence the press.⁶⁸ The facts are simply laid before the press representatives, including men of all shades of political opinion. They are free to take the facts or leave them or to make such selection as suits them. Nor is any effort made to combat false reports in the foreign press except as some French correspondent may ask for the facts in connection with such a report. Any serious case of misrepresentation is handled through diplomatic channels.

The second section of the Service of Information of the Press is occupied with the study and translation of the foreign press. About 200 foreign journals are received daily. They go into the hands of some 20 translators who

immediately clip and translate any articles which may be of value to the officials of the Foreign Office. These translations are printed at once in the daily bulletin, which is sent to the various offices of the Foreign Office, the French representatives abroad, to members of the Cabinet and all Parliamentary Commissions. Thus all officials concerned with French foreign affairs have constantly available a survey of opinion in every part of the world. Every six weeks this same section makes up a compendium of all important papers, articles and speeches for all important countries. These periodical bulletins constitute a detailed summary of the development of current events.

The third Section has the corresponding function of collecting the latest information concerning developments in France, economic, financial, artistic, etc. This information is collected into bulletins which are sent periodically to all representatives of France in foreign countries. Frequently these men are away from France for years at a time and this service assists them to keep in touch with developments at home. The Section also makes up detailed studies of special questions which are submitted to it through French representatives abroad. This Section also broadcasts daily a brief wireless service for French steamers.

The full time personnel of the Service of Information of the Press numbers from 12 to 15, while 8 or 10 translators assist the Section on a part time basis.

THE GERMAN PRESS SERVICE

In Berlin the press service is handled by a special government department which is administered jointly by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Chancellor of the Reich. It thus becomes a government press bureau rather than strictly a Foreign Office

⁶⁸ The French Foreign Minister was allowed in the 1928 budget secret funds of slightly more than \$1,000,000. Some of this is labeled "to support our propaganda and information abroad." (See *Chambre des Députés* 4875 *Rapport du Budget, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères*, 1927, pp 191, 251, 267.) The amount for 1929 under these heads is approximately \$800,000.

press bureau. Nevertheless the discussion of foreign affairs plays a very large part in its work and the bureau itself is in charge of a Foreign Service officer with the rank of Ministerialdirector.

This press division has three purposes. The first function is to furnish information to foreign correspondents concerning Germany's foreign relations and internal affairs. For this work the chief of the bureau has seven assistants each in charge of a certain section of the world. These men are for the most part younger diplomatic officers who are loaned to the press division for a certain period.

The second and third sections of the Press Department are to inform the German press, the one concerning interior matters and the other concerning foreign issues. These sections again are divided into appropriate divisions.

It is probably inevitable that the former respect for authority instilled by the Imperial régime should through sheer social inertia carry over into the republican period. German officialdom would vehemently disclaim any thought of using the Press Division to influence public opinion in their favor either at home or abroad, and yet from the very nature of the organization of German society, it is inevitable that the German press should reflect the color of official opinion as expressed through the Press Division.

This, however, is a problem which is peculiarly German and has no particular interest for Americans. What is of more value in connection with our own State Department is that the Germans have such an organization; that they put it in charge of a responsible official who enjoys the complete confidence of the head of the Government and the Foreign Minister and is thus in a position to disseminate the facts upon which

German policy both internal and external is based.

THE ITALIAN PRESS SERVICE

In the Italian Foreign Office, as in the French scheme of organization, the press division is directly under the supervision of the Undersecretary. The present chief of the Division was before his appointment to this post a prominent Fascist Deputy. His predecessor was a Minister in the Diplomatic Service. These selections indicate both the high importance which the Italians attach to the press department and a willingness, such as is found in the Anglo-Saxon countries, to use non-career men in such a post.

Like all of the Fascist offices, the Italian Press Bureau is an extremely busy place. The Chief of the Division sees everybody and talks with everybody—at least everybody who will wait the unending hours until his turn arrives. This extreme “busyness” does not seem to produce any more startling results than the more smoothly functioning offices with corresponding duties in parliamentary countries. A bi-weekly bulletin made up in the attractive style of a magazine—is published by the Division.

THE PRESS DIVISION OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT

The Department of State has listed among its numerous divisions and bureaus a Division of Current Information. This is the nearest approach to a press division which we have in the State Department. Its function is

to prepare news items from the press, to receive and reply to inquiries from newspaper correspondents, to prepare and distribute to the officials of the Department daily press summaries and special articles, to distribute to the press bulletins copies of texts and general information bearing upon foreign relations.

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Here on paper is almost the equivalent of the French Service of Information of the Press. The Division makes a heroic attempt to perform as best it may the duties thus imposed upon it. However, the conception of the Division in the State Department hardly corresponds to that of the similar services in the European Foreign Offices. The Chief of the Division is an officer of the Department and receives the pay of a Foreign Service officer of Class 7 (\$4000 a year). His assistant is a Foreign Service officer of Class 4 and these two, with three clerks to assist them, constitute the whole personnel of the Division. They do all that can possibly be done under the circumstances. The whole arrangement, however, precludes the possibility of their performing for the State Department the services rendered to the European Foreign Offices by their press sections.

While formal press releases are issued by the Division of Current Information, frequent press conferences are held either by the Secretary of State or one of the Assistant Secretaries and it is to these conferences that the correspondents look for their real news of the Department's doings. While the officials giving these conferences are as frank as ordinary discretion permits, they cannot be too liberal in these discussions of current affairs because of the official character of their statements. Consequently there is a considerable amount of informal discussion between newspaper correspondents and various officials of the Department. These officials themselves seldom gather in Department conferences and thus different officials may express quite divergent and even opposing views on the same question. The least discreet officer is apt to be most sought after by the correspondents, who have an excellent sense for the location of indiscretion.

As a result of this lack of coördination, statements of opinion are often published as "from high official sources" which represent quite inaccurately or not at all the views of the Department. Refutation is seldom successful. It seems well worth considering whether the State Department could not give much greater satisfaction to the public in its conduct of affairs if it undertook a more organized liaison with the press.

This seems a matter of special importance at a time when the public interest in our foreign relations is rapidly increasing. There is an enormous amount of mis-information in regard to foreign countries and our relations with them. This information is coupled with inaccurate or contradictory statements of the Department's views in a way which confuses public opinion and results in needless and at times obstructive criticism of the Department's activities. A properly organized section headed by an experienced officer who enjoyed the full confidence of the Secretary and the other high officials of the Department and who should be constituted the sole channel of communication with the Press, could render excellent service in disseminating accurate information both as to the activities of foreign countries and the opinions of the Department so far as they could properly be made public.

Some fear has been expressed that a Press Bureau in the Department of State would be used as a propaganda organ to support the policies of the administration in power. In so far as such a bureau might assist the public to understand the grounds upon which the decisions of the Department were made, there could be no legitimate objection to this. And there is no fear on this ground. It is rather on the ground that a Press Bureau might suppress or distort facts in order to support the

FOREIGN OFFICE ORGANIZATION

argument for the Department's course. But if the officials of the Department should attempt to adopt such a practice it would inevitably recoil upon them sooner or later. No matter how clever might be the officials of the Press Bureau, the possibility of deceiving or even seriously misleading the group of men who represent the press of this country in Washington is prac-

tically nil. Many of them are quite as familiar with the background of international developments as are the officials of the State Department themselves, and they have in the worldwide news gathering organizations to which they belong the means of checking any doubtful statement so promptly that it would be sheer folly to expect them to acquiesce in falsehood.

CHAPTER IX

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

THE general conclusions to be drawn from this survey of the organization of the great European Foreign Offices in comparison with our own State Department have already been summarized in the introductory section. There is no need to repeat them here. It may be well, however, to emphasize that the chief European Foreign Offices which the State Department must meet either in competition or collaboration are staffed with more officials, more experienced officials and—relative to the standards of the respective countries—better paid officials than those of the State Department. To the appeal of higher salaries are to be added the items of rank, honors, titles, social position and economic security. While some of these may appear to a slight extent in this country, all of them are vastly more powerful in the European countries.

On the basis of the difference in the standards of living alone, this country will have to pay salaries considerably higher than those paid abroad to secure men of the same calibre. When the intangible items are included, there must be a still higher salary differential to compensate for them.

It is apparently inertia alone which prevents a sufficient financial provision

for the State Department. For a long time the fault lay with the Department itself. None of its higher officials, probably because of the enormous pressure of routine work, envisaged the post-war needs of the Department and crystallized them into a request for the creation of sufficient offices and the payment of adequate salaries. Within the last year or two, however, this need has forced itself upon the Department. The estimate made last year by the Department would have gone farther than usual toward meeting obvious requirements, but the office of the Director of the Budget saw fit to reduce this estimate to a comparatively trifling increase over the budget for the previous year. Presumably this was done in the interest of economy. Economy in governmental expenditures is a thing greatly to be desired, but overenthusiasm for economy rapidly transforms it into parsimony. Certainly the need for economy in this country is no greater than it is in Great Britain, Germany, France or Italy. All of their national budgets are burdened with debt items which are huge in comparison with ours. Yet no one of them finds it desirable to reduce its expenditures to a figure proportionate to that which we in our

affluence cling to in the name of economy. Even the State Department's estimate for its 1929 budget could have been exceeded by several million dollars before the cost of our State Department and foreign representation approached a figure proportionate to that devoted to this work by the other great powers.

Doubtless a great deal might be done, theoretically at least, within the Department itself to improve its own efficiency, but such efforts require time and strength. So great is the load now carried by the present staff in the Department that the necessary time and strength for such matters cannot be spared from more pressing demands. And if the Department did all that could be done, if it brought the reality up to the highest ideal attainable with the present provision, it would still be lacking in many of the essentials of an adequately equipped Department. Whatever may be done,

the element of financial support must be considered as fundamental. This is one of the inescapable factors in our national adjustment to post-war conditions. It is rendered doubly important by our national eagerness to assist in the establishment of a régime of world peace. The State Department is the national instrument for this purpose. The Army and Navy are but reserves. Yet the appropriations for 1929 for the Army and Navy, total over \$773,000,000 while the State Department is limited to \$11,000,000. Cruisers may be of great value in time of war, yet there is no modern nation which even in the midst of hostilities could not easily afford to exchange a cruiser or two for an adequate diplomatic establishment. The money expended upon one cruiser would easily provide the funds necessary to give the requisite strength to the Department of State. We could afford both.

CHAPTER X

SUGGESTED APPLICATIONS

THE foregoing sections have indicated some of the ways in which European foreign office practice differs from our own. There may well be more than one opinion as to whether these differences represent improvements upon our methods. Even if it was generally agreed that European practice was at all points an improvement upon ours, it would be folly to conclude that this practice could profitably be transferred *in toto* to this country. Each country's governmental methods must, to be successful, have their roots in the political and social genius of its people. This is as true in regard to the method of handling foreign relations as in any other department of government activity.

It is fairly generally agreed, however, among those who have studied the subject, that there is room for considerable improvement in the organization and administration of the State Department. There is a widespread feeling that the equipment of the Department has not kept pace with the growth of its responsibilities. Any changes should, of course, be made with careful regard to our governmental system and administrative practice. If European methods are drawn upon for precedent, it should only be in cases where the European practice represents a further development along lines already familiar in this country rather than where it is entirely different from our own. The difference should be one of degree

rather than one of kind. The following suggestions are made with these principles in mind.

THE UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE

From the point of view of political theory it may be contended that the President himself is the real foreign minister of this country. It is true that the final decision on most questions of foreign policy rests with him. He is not subject to a majority vote in the Cabinet nor to dismissal from office by a hostile Congress. While reserving this final decision, he must nevertheless in practice vest the chief responsibility for the supervision and guidance of our foreign relations in the Secretary of State. This officer must, therefore, perform most of the functions which are performed by the foreign minister in other countries. Because of the close relationship between the President and the Secretary of State, the latter must be in close sympathy with the aims and purposes of the administration. He may, of course, be a professional diplomat. Several diplomats have served as Secretary of State in the past and there is no reason why others should not do so in the future. The nature of the office, however, requires that the first qualification of the incumbent should be a responsiveness to the political ideas of the President. In the great majority of cases this has resulted, and undoubtedly will result, in the appointment of other than career diplomats to the secretaryship.

If such a man steps into an office surrounded by a highly organized professional staff he may well find it difficult to cope with their accepted principles and traditions when those principles and traditions diverge from the general trend of public opinion. This is the thought behind the prevalent fear of a possible growth of bureaucracy in the State Department. British experience

has more than once furnished an example of this sort of thing. This experience is frequently cited as a warning against building up a professional staff in the State Department. Yet the Secretary has so many calls upon his time that he cannot hope to study in all its details every question that is brought to him for decision.

The obvious remedy is to have an Undersecretary who, like the Secretary, is a non-professional appointee. He would naturally be a man in whom the Secretary had the greatest personal confidence and upon whom he could rely to investigate every question from the non-professional point of view as it arose. Such has been the function of the Undersecretary when that officer was not a career diplomat. In order to enable the Secretary to secure a qualified incumbent for this office, however, and to retain him in the Department for more than a couple of years, it is necessary that the office should be given dignity and compensation corresponding to its responsibilities. The salary—so long as the Secretary's salary remains at \$15,000—might be fixed at \$13,500, and the Undersecretary might well be ranked as an ambassador. He would of course become Acting Secretary when occasion demanded.

SECRETARY GENERAL

As we have seen, the office of Undersecretary in the Department of State has sometimes been filled by a professional diplomat and sometimes by a non-professional appointee. The reason for this is undoubtedly that our conception of the office has embodied two incompatible functions. The idea of the Undersecretary as a chief of the regular staff of the State Department and the idea of him as a non-professional aide to the Secretary have been confused.

In view of the fact that we have al-

ready recognized the necessity of expert professional direction and advice on matters of foreign policy to the extent of appointing three experienced officers as Assistant Secretaries, it would seem quite in keeping to establish an office of Secretary General which should correspond in dignity and importance to that of Permanent Undersecretary in England, of Secretary General in France and of Staatssekretär in Germany. To be effective this officer should rank with the Undersecretary of State. The salary should be the same as that of the Undersecretary. The office should always be filled by a career officer and, except when such an arrangement was impossible, by a man who had seen service as an ambassador or had equivalent experience in the Department. In brief, the office should be so constituted as to be the goal of the entire professional service. By making it the subject of competition—not necessarily formal competition—among all of the abler officers of the Foreign Service and the Department we should be able to bring into a permanent post in Washington the man best qualified by nature, experience and training to direct the policy-making machinery of the Department.

With two officers immediately responsible to the Secretary of State, one a non-professional appointee representing the political thought of the country as embodied in the administration, the other a career man representing the professional attitude, we should have a mechanism for bringing both of these vitally important factors into the formation of our foreign policy. Where the two men were not themselves able to reconcile their conclusions on any matter of policy, their respective points of view would be laid before the Secretary for his decision. While the personality of the two officers would introduce uncertain elements, still there

would be some approach to equality in the presentation of the opposing views. At any rate the Secretary of State would be largely relieved of the onerous and exacting task of discovering and checking any tendency to professional narrowness on the part of his staff.

This arrangement would seem to offer a means of making available to the Secretary of State the competent professional guidance which is found in European foreign offices without placing him wholly in the hands of his professional advisers. The influence of the Undersecretary would reinforce that of the Secretary himself toward keeping national policies in harmony with national sentiment.

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARIES

Confining our attention for the moment to the machinery for policy-making and leaving strictly administrative questions for later consideration, the present arrangement of three Assistant Secretaries, one supervising relations with the Americas, one with Europe and one with Asia, would appear to be satisfactory from the point of view of organization. These offices, however, should be raised to the rank and dignity, and should carry with them a compensation, commensurate with their responsibilities. Each one of them might well be filled by a man who had served as ambassador or minister in its particular section of the world. An Assistant Secretary might profitably be ranked as an ambassador so that a man could be called from an embassy abroad to an Assistant Secretaryship or sent from an Assistant Secretaryship to an embassy abroad without loss of rank or dignity. A salary of \$12,000 a year would be appropriate. The Assistant Secretaries would naturally be competitors with the other career ambassadors for promotion to the office of Secretary General.

Each of these men considers the problems of world policy from the point of view of one of its major areas. It so happens, however, that the international organization of the world is rapidly increasing. This is due in large measure to the varied activities of the League of Nations and of the Pan-American conferences. As a consequence, important international meetings are following each other with greater and greater frequency. An intimate knowledge of the procedure and work of such conferences, of the men who attend them and of the national aims and susceptibilities which have to be reckoned with in them, is of the utmost value to any foreign office. Practically all of the Powers which are members of the League of Nations have found it desirable to appoint high officials to take permanent charge of their relations at Geneva. These men are participating in the development of a new technique for the handling of international relations which is destined to be of the highest importance in the decades ahead. The United States is participating in practically all of such conferences. Our representation, however, has been fitful and uncoordinated. We call now upon one of our ambassadors abroad, now on a former Secretary of State, now on a Senator or Congressman, and now on some prominent banker or industrialist to represent us in this or that conference. Sometimes the representation is good and sometimes it might be better. We have no officer of the Department of State who is growing into a knowledge of the history and technique of this new international instrument.

It is suggested, therefore, that another Assistant Secretary of State might be added to the force of the State Department to take special charge of matters which affect, not our relations with this or that particular country,

but which are in the broader sense, international. This officer would, as a matter of course, be a member of the American delegation to any international conference. He would be associated with such other delegates and be furnished with such technical experts as the particular occasion might require. After a few years his experience should make him an extremely valuable member of the Secretary's council of advisers.

Much would be gained in the way of efficiency if the Assistant Secretaries in charge of policy matters could be relieved of the numerous and varied administrative duties which they are now required to assume. They should be men whose interest and training is in policy-making and their work in this regard should not be subject to constant interruption for a decision on some administrative detail. Possible exceptions in this regard might be made. For example, the Assistant Secretary who has supervision over Asia has an essentially unified problem and has under his supervision only one geographical division (Far Eastern). The Division of Publications and the Press Division are so closely related to the policy activities of the Department that it is quite desirable that they should be in direct touch with the higher officials who devote their main attention to policy. These Divisions might well be left under the supervision of the Assistant Secretary who has charge of Asia. Similarly the Treaty Division and the Protocol Division are closely related to the political activities of the Department and might well come under the supervision of the additional Assistant Secretary charged with supervision of international affairs.

CHIEFS OF DIVISION

After the Assistant Secretaries, the men most concerned with the making of

policy are the Chiefs of Division. The six geographical divisions among which the political work of the Department is now distributed seem to answer the purpose fairly well with one possible exception. The Latin American Division deals with all of the republics of the Americas except Mexico, for which there is a special Division. This means that our relations with nineteen countries are handled by one group of ten men. Unfortunately there has been a great deal of shifting in the personnel of this Division. This may be remedied in some degree as the whole question of the staffing of the State Department receives consideration. But in view of the fact that so many countries are involved, the fact that our interests in and relations with each of those countries are growing so rapidly and the fact that our policy toward some of these countries must involve elements which are not present in our policy toward the remainder of them, it is possible that the time is at hand when the Latin American Division might profitably be reorganized into two Divisions, one for Central America and the Caribbean and the other for South America.

The Chiefs of Division at present are some of them drafting officers and some of them Foreign Service officers. The fundamental principles of organization demand a continuity of administration in a Division, which is only possible if the chief remains at his post fairly permanently. This, as has been seen, is impossible with Foreign Service officers whose stay in the Department is limited to four years. With sufficient appropriations non-career officers might be appointed to all of these posts.

It is suggested, however, that the office of Chief of Division might well be made sufficiently responsible to command the rank and salary of a minister—\$10,000 a year. If this were done it

would enable the Secretary of State either to appoint qualified drafting officers or to transfer a minister with actual experience in one or more of the countries concerned, to the post of Chief of Division. With the increased salary and dignity no demotion would be involved in such a transfer, nor would the four year limitation be applicable. The result should be to bring to the service of the Secretary a wider experience and a more mature judgment than can be long available in these posts under the present system.

It is probable that the work of the Divisions could be further improved under such leadership by a judicious distribution of the personnel of the Solicitor's office and of the office of the Economic Adviser. These two offices now function somewhat independently and it is possible that if each geographical Division should have its own legal expert and its own economic expert who devoted their entire time to the problems of the particular area covered by the Division, there would be a more expeditious and probably a more accurate handling of business. It is understood that a beginning has already been made in this matter.

As at present, the personnel of the Division should be reinforced by attaching Foreign Service officers to them. Instead of placing these officers in charge of the Divisions or even using them as assistant chiefs, they should be brought in for the express purpose of placing at the disposal of the Department a fresh and immediate knowledge of the men and the forces influencing the countries in which they have served. At the same time these Foreign Service officers working in the Department under experienced chiefs would be enabled to obtain a clearer understanding of the Department's point of view and purposes and would go back to their chosen field

of service abroad with an enlarged equipment for the performance of their duties there. Such an arrangement would be a realization of the original purpose of the Rogers Act in providing for the assignment of Foreign Service officers to Washington. Such assignment under the suggested arrangement would benefit both the Department and the officer. This has not always been the case in the past.

ECONOMIC ADVISER

The suggestion made above that an economic expert be assigned to each geographical division would by no means eliminate the need of an Economic Adviser. On the contrary, the increasing importance of economic and financial affairs in international relations, makes it highly desirable that the State Department should have the best of advice in economic and financial matters. The Economic Adviser should be an officer of sufficient training and experience to enable him to supervise and coördinate the work of the divisional economic experts and to handle the larger problems which affect areas too great to be covered by any one of the geographical divisions. He should rank with the other Division Chiefs and receive a salary equal to theirs.

LEGAL ADVISER

The habit of appointing a lawyer as Secretary of State has acquired almost the dignity of a custom. Possibly this practice has tended to minimize the importance of the Department's law officer. It is no reflection upon the legal ability of future Secretaries of State to suggest that they will find ample occupation for all of their time and strength without attempting to be their own legal advisers. The problems of the United States will henceforth be such that their legal

aspects should have the undivided attention of a man fully competent to handle them. The Legal Adviser should not only command the confidence of the Secretary and the other officers of the Department, he should be a man of sufficient standing in international law, to command the confidence of the Bar and the public. It would be still further desirable that he should be able to command the respect of the political officers and the legal experts of other countries.

We have sufficiently demonstrated that it is not possible to hold our great authorities on international law in the State Department by offering them a minor position and a trifling salary. The suggestion is made that the office of Legal Adviser of the State Department be created, carrying with it the same rank and salary as an Assistant Secretary.

THE SOLICITOR

It would hardly serve the purpose of the above suggestion to follow the plan which has been advocated and abolish the office of Solicitor, transferring the duties of that office to the Legal Adviser. One of the aims of the new office would be to make available to the Secretary of State the counsel of a man who was not only competent in the whole field of international jurisprudence, but who would have the opportunity to devote his attention to its broader and more constructive aspects. Little would be gained if such an officer were to be saddled with all the minute detail which is now carried by the Solicitor's office.

While some general supervision of all the legal activities of the Department would naturally be vested in the Legal Adviser, the actual direction and co-ordination of the work of the legal experts, assigned to the various geographical divisions, the details of the drafting

of treaties and other agreements and the entire routine work of the Department, would demand the attention of another officer who might well retain the title of Solicitor. He should have the rank and pay of a Chief of Division.

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER

If the organization of the policy-making sections of the Department of State were to be elaborated as suggested above, it would represent a natural growth along our present lines of development and would furnish to the Secretary of State a council of advisers comparable in rank, experience and pay to that to be found in the larger foreign offices abroad. There would still be left the question of administration.

This item should present no serious difficulty to a country whose daily life runs in such large measure through the forms of corporate organization. There are thousands of men of ample experience and demonstrated ability, of whom one might be induced to undertake the task of administration, in the State Department, if there were a position of sufficient dignity and reasonable compensation to offer him. The obvious way to do this would be to establish a position as Administrative Officer, with the rank and pay of an Assistant Secretary, and to make the Administrative Officer responsible for all of the activities of the Department not directly related to policy making. The borderline cases of the Solicitor's office, the Division of Publications and the Press Division have already been considered.

That would be the obvious thing to do. There would be a dozen ways in which the heterogeneous departments, divisions, bureaus and offices could be marshalled into a smooth-running organization under two or three division chiefs. An experienced business ex-

ecutive would have comparatively little difficulty with that. There would be one question, however, which would require very special consideration. That is the matter of personnel. Competently to handle this, the Administrative Officer might have to add to the qualifications of a business executive those of a grand opera impresario. At least he would find invaluable the qualifications of a good college dean.

The delicacy of the personnel matter would appear to make desirable some less obvious arrangement in the position of Administrative Officer. He should first be free in so far as it is humanly possible from all "political" influence, whether it be in the form of approaches by Senators and Congressmen or in the less formal friendliness of his Department colleagues. To this end his rank should be somewhat above that of the Assistant Secretaries of State, a matter easily accomplished by paying him \$500 a year more. Then he should be made directly responsible to the Secretary of State, without control by the Secretary General, or by the Undersecretary, except when the latter becomes Acting Secretary.

There would thus be centered in the Administrative Officer, subject to the control of the Secretary alone, complete responsibility in all questions of promotion and assignment. He would be as free as is humanly possible to place all his recommendations on the basis of an objective consideration of the quality of services rendered. His one defense in the event of criticism on account of any promotion or assignment would be his ability to show the records which would support his decision. It would take a cold-blooded, unemotional type of character, but a man of suitable qualities could render invaluable service in restoring the morale of the Foreign Service and Department officers.

Probably one of the first tasks of the Administrative Office would be to free the Department employes from the conflicting control of the several Boards and Commissions which now harass their careers. For this purpose it has been suggested that the drafting officers and other officers on the Department's staff above the clerical grades should be combined into one Service of Foreign Relations, graded and salaried by law in the same manner as the Foreign Service under existing statutes. Such a recognition of the exceptional tasks and exceptional requirements of the State Department, such a recognition that it is impossible to handle its personnel in the same manner as that of the other government departments, would be the greatest single service that Congress could render to increase the efficiency of our international machinery.

Assuming such a fortunate beginning, the Administrative Officer's next task would be to neutralize the rivalry which now exists between diplomatic and consular branches of the service, into which rivalry the inclusion of the Department officers might well introduce a third element. The younger Department officers, not having evinced a desire for service abroad, would present no serious problem in the beginning. Newly admitted Foreign Service officers should be tried out in both the diplomatic and consular branches for the first two or three years of their service. The experience with a united service would seem to furnish an unanswerable argument that after such a trial period they should be assigned definitely to one branch or the other and remain in that branch, subject only to facultative transfers to meet specific needs, until they have reached the rank of counselor or consul-general.

The next step would be to apportion the number of Department staff offi-

cers, of diplomatic officers and of consular officers in each grade of the Service of Foreign Relations according to the needs of the service. This ratio once established should be preserved in making promotions and no change made in it except at long intervals, to meet the demands of the service and not those of the officers.

Having eliminated the rivalry between the consular and diplomatic officers and the potential rivalry of the Department officers, the path of the Administrative Officer would be made smoother. As the ultimate aim must be to promote an *esprit de corps* in all three branches which would enable the service to function at its highest efficiency, another suggestion may be in order. Under present conditions the only way to promote a Consul-General is to make him a Minister. The Consuls-General who are in line for such promotion would in most cases be those in charge of the most important consulates-general—London, Paris, etc. These offices are very considerable organizations handling a business running into millions of dollars a year. They have practically no political functions.

After a man has reached the top of the consular service and has satisfactorily administered one of these huge consulates-general, promotion may be due him. He is usually tendered a post as Minister in one of the smaller republics to the south of us. This would appear to be unfair both to the officer and to the post. It takes the officer away from an important work which he has demonstrated his ability to handle and sends him on a mission of an entirely different character for which he has had no training and in which he has had no experience. From the point of view of the service it is equally unfortunate. The realization is being forced upon us that our

relations with our Latin American neighbors are of the highest importance. The demands upon our diplomats increase as reliance upon our marines becomes more and more repugnant to public opinion. These posts need skilled men of long and careful training in the most delicate diplomatic work. No such training is, or will be, possible for men in the consular branch of the service. Their services, and usually their tastes, are of quite another character.

There are but two definite desiderata in the promotion of a Consul-General to be a Minister. One is the title, the other is an addition of one thousand dollars to the annual salary. Would there not be some advantage in attaching the rank and pay of minister to five or six of our most important consulates-general? The incumbents of these positions would, of course, not be accredited to the foreign governments except in the capacity of consul-general but in our own service they would enjoy the higher rank and pay. Their training and experience would thus be made available in its proper field and at the same time the dead-end would be removed from the road of consular promotion.

For reasons somewhat analogous, although with a rather different emphasis, it might be well to consider at the same time accrediting the counselors at two or three of our most important embassies as ministers. This would strengthen our representation in the great capitals at trifling expense and would enable us in one more way to use experience and training where they are most valuable.

BOARD OF APPEAL

These suggestions touch upon some of the minor questions of personnel administration. There remains a major question. Under present regula-

tions the efficiency record of a Foreign Service officer cannot be seen by him. Unfavorable reports and even specific charges of misfeasance or malfeasance may remain unanswered against his name for years. If such secret records are to form the basis of the recommendations of a single officer of permanent tenure it would be difficult indeed to establish any widespread confidence in his administration.

Discussion of this problem with a great many Foreign Service officers leads to certain suggestions. The first suggestion is that the efficiency reports be segregated into two divisions. One of these shall contain the personal opinion of superior officers and inspectors upon the character and work of each individual. In order to secure frankness in such reports and to make them of greater usefulness to the Administrative Officer they must be held confidential. There is no injustice to the individual officer in this as any prejudiced report by one superior or inspector would soon be offset by the reports of other officers. A succession of reports should reflect fairly accurately the qualities of the officer reported upon. Any report, however, which contains a specific charge against an officer should be placed in the other division and a copy of the charges at once forwarded to the officer accused, who should be given an opportunity to answer them while the incident is recent and witnesses and evidence readily available.

This suggestion brought a fair degree of agreement among the Foreign Service officers consulted. There was still, however, a lingering fear of the effect of a one-man administration of personnel if the Administrative Officer should happen to be a man of strong personal prejudices. Here we come again to the heart of the whole question of personnel administration. It is

because of the failure to eliminate personal prejudices and interests from personnel administration, in the past, that discouragement is today so prevalent in the Foreign Service. It may be that the quickest and surest way to restore the morale of the service would be through the injection of some dramatic element that might not be necessary or desirable under other circumstances. Out of my discussions with Foreign Service officers there arose a suggestion which might be so characterized.

This suggestion is that there shall be constituted a board of three officers which, to distinguish it from the now extinct Board of Review, may be designated for present purposes, the Board of Appeal. The members of this board might be nominated and elected by the three branches of the Service of Foreign Relations by means of a postal nomination and ballot. One man from the highest two grades of the diplomatic service might be chosen each year by the officers who have been definitely assigned to that branch. Similarly the consular officers might elect a man from their highest two grades. In the case of these two members the fact of their election should in advance be held either to place their names upon the list recommended for promotion in that year or to prevent their names from being placed on that list. It makes little difference which course is followed so long as it is definitely known before their nomination and election. There will be no question, then, of their passing upon their own qualifications in competition with those of their colleagues. The third member of the Board of Appeal might be elected by the Department officers of the Service of Foreign Relations and, as members of the Departmental staff would otherwise be taken from their regular duties to give their time to personnel matters,

the Departmental candidate might well be a retired diplomat or other public official, a great many of whom live in and about Washington.

The members of the Board of Appeal should serve for one year and should be ineligible for reelection. They would have access to all of the efficiency reports on the various officers (except their own). They should also have charge of all hearings on specific charges against any officer and should be required to file findings and recommendations in each case. During the year they would make careful examination and appraisal of the record of each member of the Service of Foreign Relations. Whenever the Secretary requested a list of recommendations for promotion from the Administrative Officer he should at the same time request a similar list from the Board of Appeal. It might be required that, in submitting his own recommendations to the President, the Secretary should include at least 75 per cent of the names submitted by the Board of Appeal. The 25 per cent not so controlled would allow the Secretary and Administrative Officer to care for all exceptional cases and special needs. If there was not at least 75 per cent agreement between the Administrative Officer's list and the Board of Appeal's list it would be a fair conclusion that something was wrong. In that case members of the Service would feel far more confidence if the Board's list should control to the extent of 75 per cent at least. This might be further strengthened by requiring the recommendation to the President of any officer who was recommended by two successive Boards of Appeal and whose name had not been submitted to the President after the first Board recommendation.

If it be argued that this is a complicated piece of machinery and introduces new and unheard of elements

into the administration of personnel, there will be found many in the service to reply that it is no more complicated than the various systems which have been tried and have failed in the past; that it offers the possibility of a workable compromise between the efficiency of autocratic control and such security as there may be in a democratic element. In so much as the personnel problem is by far the most serious now facing the Department and the restoration of morale a condition precedent to the establishment of an effective foreign establishment, even a suggestion which on its face may seem a bit bizarre is worthy of careful consideration.

Nor should a point be overlooked which must be of special interest both to the Secretary of State and his principal subordinates and to Senators and Congressmen. So long as there remains an autocratic system of personnel management in the Foreign Service, the democratic instinct which pervades all branches of the government will find expression somewhere. At present it demonstrates its vitality by appeals from disgruntled officers to Senators and Congressmen. These in turn are called upon to form committees of investigation. Foreign Service officers are invited to submit their complaints to a Senatorial or Congressional committee with the understanding that their communications will be considered as confidential. Such a procedure is quite legal; there is nothing even of impropriety about it. Yet its direct result is to increase the discontent in the service by giving it opportunity for anonymous expression. The only justification for such a procedure would be a prompt removal of the conditions which invite it.

It is quite conceivable that if there were a balance of autocratic and democratic methods along the lines suggested for the State Department's per-

sonnel administration, there would be left little cause for further Congressional investigations of the kind mentioned. An officer who had failed to win promotion either through the Administrative Officer, or through an elective Board of Appeal, would have little basis left for complaint against the system of administration. The most solicitous Senator or Congressman might well feel it beneath his dignity to take his own time, and that of his colleagues, for personnel hearings under such circumstances. It would be more appropriate for them to recommend to discontented officers, either that they devote their efforts more wholeheartedly to their work, or that they resign and seek occupation in a more congenial field.

IN CONCLUSION

One further suggestion, which has to do with no particular office, may be made here. The argument that the State Department salaries should be raised, in order that the Secretary might secure more mature and experienced advisers, has been met by the counter-argument that raising salaries does not have the desired effect, that it simply pays more money to the men who already hold the positions and that the average of experience, maturity or ability, is not affected in the slightest.

This counter-argument is only partly valid. In so far as higher salaries would tend to retain in the Department, some of the officers who are already there and who will not remain indefinitely on the present scale of compensation, such higher salaries for present officials would be quite justified. As for the others, there is substance to the argument. As the purpose of the suggested salary scale is to bring into the Department men of more mature years, men of longer experience, men of

riper judgment, very possibly men who have formerly served in the highest offices of the Department as now constituted, that purpose would of course be frustrated by indiscriminately raising the salaries of the present officers. Let it be repeated, that there is no criticism directed at the earnestness or the ability of the present officials. They have amply demonstrated their possession of both in order to reach the positions they now occupy. It would be a catastrophe if their services were lost to the Department. But in case of the reorganization of the Department, the Secretary should be free to appoint to the more responsible positions contemplated, men now holding

executive positions in the Department, men now serving abroad as chiefs of mission or men from outside the service altogether.

It is possible to accomplish this by shaping the necessary legislation not as a bill to raise salaries but as a bill to reorganize the Department. The higher executive offices required might be established as newly created posts which would supersede the existing offices when appointments to the new offices are made and confirmed in the usual manner. The Secretary would then be free to assign each man in his organization to the work in which his ability and experience would be of the greatest value.

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